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Int roduc t ion
The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation played a vital
role in supplying the United States' Navy with aircraft during the
Second World War. The company supplied three of the most numerous
types purchased by the Navy from 1940-1945 and over one-half of all
carrier aircraft used by the American Navy during World War II.
Table 1.1
Top Four Naval Aircraft
In Number Built During World War II
1) Vought F4U Corsair* 12,51*1
2) Grumman F6F Hellcat 12,275
3) Grumman TBF Avenger** 9.S37
4)Grumman F4F Wildcat*** 7,893
*7,829 built by Chance Vought, 4,017 by Goodyear,
and 735 by Brewster.
**7,522 (TBMs) built by Eastern Aircraft Division of
General Motors, the rest by Grumman.
***5,927 built by Eastern Aircraft Division of General
Motors, the rest by Grumman.
This corporation had been in business for just over a decade prior
to the United States' entry into the war, but in that time it had
risen from a small "auto garage" plant to a company housing nearly
700,000 square feet of work space, and it had also become one of the
Navy's prime suppliers.
The 1930s were supposed to be a rough period for small com-
panies in the aircraft industry. The large holding companies'
control of the industry was being solidified by the Depression, yet
Grumman was able to show continued growth throughout the period.
How did this small corporation break into the industry during a
period of decline? How was it able to become a military supplier
when it seemed as if the market was sewn up? How did the company
2hold onto the position as a leading naval aircraft manufacturer and
continue to grow up to the Second world iVar and beyond? The ingred-
ients to Grumman's prosperity were numerous, but there were a few
that s t ood out
.
The first component was it's management, led by President Roy
Grumman and Vice-President and General Manager Leon Swirbul. This
administration planned carefully and systematically in order to
obtain a production contract and establish the company as a viable
aircraft manufacturer. Management made many important decisions
which guided the future of Grumman Aircraft, such as what type of
airframes to manufacture and what market to enter. Management also
made some sound financial moves during the decade that aided the ex-
pansion of the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation.
Another feature responsible for Grumman's growth was it's ex-
cellent engineering staff which kept the company's airframes on the
leading edge of the developments in naval avaiation throughout the
decade. The young firm was engineer heavy, having a number of young,
yet experienced draftsmen who worked together in pairs or teams.
This allowed two or more minds to solve difficulties that arose. The
engineering staff was not dominated by a single individual, but
there were some exceptional men in this group. Roy Grumman assisted
in the drafting process, and he was responsible for two patented
features used on several of the company's airframes. His philosophy
of strength and simplicity in aircraft construction was instilled in
the entire staff. Chief Engineer William Schwendler was another
catalyst to the effectiveness of the designs issued from the cor-
poration. He was not only responsible for a great share of the blue-
prints drawn up, but his supervision of the entire department kept
it moving forward. The engineers' designs led to a number of
3"firsts" in naval aviation, and helped the company break some
records in the number of planes contracted. The engineers were
assisted by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),
which in the 1930s was a government organization researching air-
craft design, primarily for military use. Grumman would use several
of it's airfoils and cowlings. Grumman's engineers, through their
own and the government's work, were able to utilize the development
resulting from the technological revolution taking place in the air-
craft industry during the 1920s and early 1930s.
Complimentary to the draftsmen was a skilled group of craftsmen
in the experimental construction crew. Standing out in this group
was it's leader, Julie Holpit. He had an uncanny ability to visual-
ize the two-dimens
i
ional blueprints as they would be in 3-D, en-
abling him to spot design errors or problematic areas. The speed and
quality of the entire experimental team's work was a fruitful
alliance with the acompl i shment s of the engineers, being greatly
responsible for the high percentage of Grumman prototypes leading to
production contracts.
Another key ingredient to the good fortune of Grumman Aircraft
was it's association with the United States Navy. There was no
written agreement, nor was there likely a known verbal command, in
the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to give the company preferential
treatment; however the Navy seemed to be quite congenial to helping
the Long Island manufacturer get established. One reason for this
was the Navy's desire for another aircraft supplier free from en-
tanglement in conflicting markets. The naval background of Grumman's
personnel was yet another link.
Another compliment to the firm's rise during the decade was the
growth of carrier avaiation. The company emerged just after the in-
utroduction of the Lexington and Saratoga , the first real fleet
carriers of the United States Navy (the Langley being considered an
experimental vessel). By December 1941, five more fleet carriers
were operational and many times this number were on order. With this
growth came the need for more aircraft built specifically for
carrier operations, the predominant area the corporation worked in.
Naval aircraft expenditures dipped downward with the Depression, but
grew at a moderate rate from 1934 to 1940. Grumman would also expand
at a steady gai t
.
There were numerous other ingredients for Grumman' s successful
first decade. It's geographical position in the industrial northeast
was valuable for obtaining necessary materials such as aluminum and
for shipping the company's finished goods to the United States
Navy's ports, or exporting them to Europe or South America. The
location also allowed the firm an abundant source of metal workers
and machine operators laid off in the aircraft industry or other
industries because of the Depression. This aided Grumman in obtain-
ing the best personnel for it's production lines. The company's de-
creasing costs per pound of airframe also helped it gain contracts.
The lack of preparedness by the Allied Navies in Europe, at least in
the area of aviation, also contributed to the firm gaining orders
after the war broke out in 1939. Similarly the United States re-
armament program just prior to it's entrance to the war pushed it's
sales upward. In comparison to the entire industry, Grumman's growth
was not phenomenal except during the first four years. The rest of
the decade stayed relatively steady to the industry's pace.
It was during the war that Grumman Aircraft climbed in the
ranks of the aeronautical industry. The number of aircraft built
from it's designs was much, much greater. The reason for it's
success in this period came from it's accomplishments in the 1930s.
Examination in detail of the Grumman story will explain how this was
done
.
Grumman 's Formative Years, 1929-1933
Though the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation was
established in December 1929, four years passed before it's first
aircraft production contract was completed. Nevertheless the cor-
poration's annual earnings increased during this period, so Grumman
defied the odds of a small firm surviving in the aircraft industry
of the early 1930s. The company's first four years coincides with
the financial decline from the initial stages to the depth of the
Depression. Small aircraft manufacturers with low capital reserves
struggled to survive, and a large proportion failed. The industry
was dominated by holding companies. The United Aircraft & Transport
Corporation and the Cur t i ss-wr igh t Corporation, the two most power-
ful aircraft oligopolies, obtained 715b of the Navy's aircraft
business, close to 80% of the Army's purchases, and approximately
945b of the United States' commercial sales from 1927 to 1933. 2
There was a widely held assumption by small manufacturers that the
Manufacturers' Aircraft Association, a world War I pool made up
primarily of big corporation controlled the industry and the
government's procurement decisions thereby sewing up the military
market so new contenders could not compete. Grumman had limited
capital and was not part of a holding company or the Manufacturers
Aircraft Association, yet when most small companies were just try-
ing to elude bankruptcy, it was able to advance and establish itself
as a notable naval aircraft manufacturer.
What were the reasons behind the young business' financial
achievements from 1930 to 1933? It's leaders' decision to produce
fighters and amphibians for the United States Navy was one com-
ponent, as was the planning on how to earn working capital while
7getting established in the naval market. Complimentary to the com-
pany's decisions was the Navy's need for carrier aircraft and it's
desire for another supplier that could devote most of it's attention
to naval needs. The manufacturer's engineers would be very crucial
to the inital success, for their designs would form the foundation
of a positive reputation for Grumman aircraft soon to be held by
many in the Bureau of Aeronautics down to naval pilots. The firm's
utilization of the latest aeronautical technology provided Grumman
prototypes with respectable performance and figures that enabled the
firm to gain contracts.
The origins of Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation came
in 1928 when the New York investment firm llayden, Stone and Company,
a part of the Cur t i ss-'.vr icht Corporation, bought out Loening Air-
craft Company, a Long Island naval and commercial aircraft manu-
facturer. Loening was absorbed by Keystone Aircraft, a subsidiary of
Cur t i ss-Wr ight . A group of Loening workers led by factory manager
LeRoy Grumman and Leon Swirbul however, did not want to join the
Keystone work force in Bristol, Pennsylvania. They persuaded most of
what they viewed as the elite of Loening's workers to become part of
a new company being formed by emphasizing the facts that the merger
called for relocation and the acceptance of demotions in position.
Grover and A. P. Loening, the brothers who headed Loening Air-
craft, approved of the formation of a new corporation, but the
agreements in the Keystone merger limited them to being investors.
The capital they provided was a large percentage of the inital in-
vestments (See Appendix 1). Grover Loening was a respected in-
dividal in the industry, being an officer in aeronautical organi-
zations and a consultant to the government on aviation affairs
during the 1930s. His association with industry's elite did not hurt
8the corporation's chance of gaining contracts, for he at least once,
and likely on many more occasions referred potential buyers to
GrujEunan Aircraft. The rest of the investors were part of the new
management
.
The background of the leaders of Grumman' s management revealed
the engineering experience of each individual. It also showed their
knowledge of naval aircraft, influencing the decision of what to
build and who to build it for. Roy Grumman, the president and second
largest investor in the new firm, graduated from Cornell in 1916 at
the age of twenty with a degree in mechanical engineering. He then
worked for a short time for the New York Telephone Company. When the
United States entered World War 1 in April 1917, Hoy enlisted in the
Navy and became a Machinists iv.ate, 2nd Class. He was then sent to
Columbia University to study engine operations on submarine chasers,
but while there he applied for avaiation duty. His request to become
a pilot was turned down because of his flat feet, but he was sent to
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.l.T.) to study aircraft in-
spection. In a few weeks he realized that a mistake had been made
and that he was actually in ground school for flight training, but
he kept quiet. After learning elementary flying at Miami's Naval Air
Station, he was sent to Pensacola in July 1918 to complete his
flight instruction. Graduating on 7 September 1918 as a naval
avaiator, Ensign Grumman stayed at Pensacola to serve as a bombing
squadron's flight instructor. Once this tour was completed, Roy
applied for the Naval Course in aeronautical engineering taught at
in.I.T. He studied under Edward P. Warner, later head of the C.A.B.
Upon completion of this course, Roy rose to Lieutenant, junior grade
and was sent to the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia as a pro-
ject engineer and test pilot. He served as the production super-
9visor, and flew the test flights, on Navy-built Loening fighter while
at the NAF, catching the eye of Grover Loening who soon offered him
a job. On 30 September 1920 the twenty-five year old Lieutenant re-
signed from the Navy to serve as General Manager and Test Pilot for
Loening Aircraft. While working here from 1920 to 1929, his major
contribution came with the Loening amphibian which he helped design
and fly. rtoy was largely responsible for the perfection of it's
landing gear, an area that would be important to the beginning of
his company. Grumman felt his background played an important part in
his decision to run his own corporation. Later he stated, "sAy World
war 1 experience as a Naval Aviator enabled me to gain knowledge and
experience with aircraft that in 1929, 1 formed Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corporation... '" Roy Grumman had an abundance of
practical experience designing and flying naval aircraft when he be-
came president of the new firm.
Leon "Jake" Swirbul, the extroverted Vice-President and General
Manager of the new corporation, had been a civilian aircraft in-
spector for the United States Army Corps before joining Loening in
the mid-1920s. Although he led an active social life, this did not
keep him from maintaining a rigorous work schedule. He saw to it
that the assembly line ran smoothly, roaming the shop floor and con-
versing with employees to learn if they were encountering any dif-
ficulties in their assigned tasks. His door was always open, and
workers were encouraged to come and discuss their likes and dis-
likes, and needs or desires. His amiable personality made everyone
feel comfortable in his presence. Swirbul's social abilities placed
him in charge of entertaining many of the visitors (such as military
personnel and federal or foreign government dignitaries). Historian
David Anderson stated that Swirbul's visibility was so high it seem-
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ed as if he, not Grumman was the real mover and shaker in the com-
pany. Although Swirbul was important, Grumann had a greater in-
fluence on the company.
Chief Engineer William T. Schwendler earned a degree in aero-
nautical engineering from New York University in 1924, and already
had practical experience having worked part-time for Chance Vought,
another naval aircraft manufacturer which became a subsidiary of
U.A. & T. lie was hired by Loening as an engineer the same year. He
was a firm believer in stout construction of aircraft, and passed
this philosophy on to the rest of the design crew at Grumman. His
doubling of strength in the vital areas of an aircraft became known
as the "Schwendler factor." He would be greatly responsible for
the numerous piston-engineered fighters which were produced on
Crumman's drafting boards, and the reputation they would gain for
their rugged airframes.
Hounding out the corporation's officers was Edmund Poor, for-
merly an assistant treasurer at Loening who would head this division
at Grumman. Poor's assistant was Clint Towl , who had studied en-
gineering at Cornell for two years before learning the brokerage
business in New York. Each invested in the company. Joseph Stamm did
not invest, but was made company secretary and purchasing agent.
Historian Charles Bright called this group a "closely knit associa-
tion of fliers from the twenties, the management of Grumman has apt-
ly been called inbred." The majority of the administration had
a real grasp of aeronautical engineering, giving the company a group
that studied the initial design critically and stated their opin-
ions. This knowledge also allowed them to relate to the needs of the
engineers and production crews.
During the last months at Loening the new management made the
11
key decision to enter the naval market. This choice proved to be ad-
vantageous, but may have been questioned in 1320. In that year com-
mercial airframe production stood at approximately $33 million,
three times higher that military airframe building. Commercial pro-
duction seemed to be the lucrative market for the future, while
those in the military market could expect fierce competition for
it's limited funds. Sales to the military had dropped from $16
million in 1923 to just over $10 million in 1929. The Great De-
pression caused a drastic change in the industry's sales. Military
sales remained fairly constant in the first years due to the five
year plans in motion, however by 1932 commercial purchases fell to
only $2.5 million. This downturn could not have been anticipated
by management, so why did the company choose to enter the military
market?
Financial considerations played a ihajor part in the decision to
construct military aircraft. Simply put, the young corporation did
not have the capital to absorb the losses of experimental work
necessary in the production of airframes. In commercial manufactur-
ing the company had to pay all the expenses of exper i emen t a t ion
,
hoping to gain the money back in eventual sales. If no contracts
were obtained, it could not make up the loss and still have the
capital to continue the experimentation process on another design.
One or two designs moving through the research stages without gain-
ing a contract could prove financially devastating. In contrast the
military bought experimental models, and while this did not always
totally reimburse the manufacturer for all it's costs, it provided a
substantial remuneration. In it's formative years, Grumman Aircraft
could accept the minimal losses of the design phase in research air-
frames not acquired by the military, or the deficit incurred in
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building exper imen tal aircraft purchased by the military; but it
could ill afford the total losses of experimentation.
The naval market rfas also chosen because of the past exper-
ience of the management and engineers. These men had all v/orked
with the naval establishment while at Loening and knew it would be
much easier to obtain contracts from the Navy who knew them per-
sonally and also knew the quality of their work. They also real-
ized the benefits brought by Roy Grumman's acquaintance with those
in the high circles of naval avaiation. Edward P. viarner, Hoy
Grumman' s aeronautical engineering instructor at M.l.T. was the
first Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics. He held
this position when Grumman's management was making it's decision
(but during most of the 1930s he held the position of Vice- Presi-
dent of U.A. & T.). His successor, David Ingalls, was a former
naval pilot contemporary to Roy Grumman. Both had been Lieutenants
(j.g.) in the Fall of 1918. The naval aviation community was small
up to the Second World War, therefore Roy Grumman knew personally
from his days as a pilot, instructor, an engineer at the NAF, and
as General Manager of Loening, many of these men who rose into the
Bureau of Aeronautics, and was acquainted with others at least by
name and reputation. His experience was a key factor in choosing
to build for the Navy.
ivianagemen t knew that gaining a production contract would be
competitive with Boeing, Chance Vought, Douglas, Curtiss, and
others already firmly established as naval aircraft manufacturers,
so they planned a systematic order to obtain a plane contract.
They first hoped to establish a name and some working capital by
designing a float for the Navy. They also took on other work, such
as the repair of aircraft, to gain funding for their aircraft
13
projects. The third step was to design an airplane for the Navy.
Then they hoped to gain a production contract.
The first step was tackled during the last months with
t-oening when Roy Grumman and Bill Schwendler designed a float,
utilizing Hoy's newly patented retractable undercarriage, better
suited to military performance. The hull would be stronger yet
lighter, and the 'wheels would retract far enough to be flush with
the hull for more aerodynamic and hydrodynamic cleanliness. The
landing mechanism moved in a slightly deviated parallelogram
rather than along a protracted arc swinging on a single hinge
like that used on the Loening amphibian (See diagram A.l S A. 2).
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The engineer's blueprints for the float also included a mono
coque design which obtained it's strength throuan s t re s sed-sk i
n
H
rather than a heavy framework. ..ionocoque construction reduced the
weight of the design without reducing it's strength. Aluminum
ring-shaped frames connected by lateral aluminum ribs, all cover-
ed by a heat or chemically hardened alloy outer covering was the
basis of monocoque construction. It was just making it's entrance
in naval airframe building, and it played an important part in the
technological revolution that took place in the 1920s and 1930s in
the aircraft industry. Grumman ' s use of the monocoque design show-
ed that the company was up to date on the latest techniques used
in aircraft construction while working on it's first project. The
navy Department's Bureau of Aeronautics was skeptical about the
strength of Grumman's monocoque float design, but granted the firm
a contract for two experimental floats for S33,700. y The float was
named the Model A (See Photo 1.1).
Swirbul found a small shop for Grumman Aircraft in Daldwin
(Long Island), New York which had previously been home to an
automotive showroom and garage (See Photo 1.2). "Clint" Towl was
placed in charge of cleaning and preparing than plant for opening.
Grumman and Schwendler were nearly finished with the .'.iodel A
design when the business opened on 2 January 1930.
Photo 1.1: Photo 1.2:
MODEL "A" FLOAT, first devel-
opment of the Grumman organi-
zation. Designed for the U. S.
Navy, because of the lack of
amphibians at that time, and used
on standard scout planes. Weight
of entire installation, including re-
tracting mechanism, was 700 lbs.
Source: Grumman Advertisement, Aero Digest , vol. 36, no. 1
(1/1/40). p. 50.
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The reasons Grumman built a float are easily distinguished.
It required a low amount of capital, yet it could bring in enough
to keep the small manufacturer functioning while aircraft designs
were drafted. It was also a good way to earn a favorable reputa-
tion in naval circles, for the engineers believed they could
easily build a better float than the heavy wood-framed types in
use by the service .
To fulfill the second item on management's plan to gain a
major order, Grumman looked for repair work on Loening amphibians.
It was hoped such work would keep the shop busy and pay the oper-
ating expenses of the manufacturer. Ttjis was not successful in
generating a large volume of business.
Grumman quickly took it's third step in the management ' s plan
to become an established aircraft manufacturer. On 26 February
1930, Roy and Jake met with Commander Webster, Chief of Designs in
the Bureau of Aeronautics, with the company's proposal for a high-
performance two-seat fighter using Roy's patented landing gear. A
couple weeks later informal proposals and drawings were sent to
Commander /vebster. These were informally approved by Webster on 29
March, and were followed by specific designs and data. This was
the beginning of the XFF-1, X for experimental, F for fighter, F
for Grumman (G had already been taken by Great Lakes). Informal
discussion would be undertaken on each successive design, but
there is little record of the contents of such meetings.
The XFF-1, as the Navy designated Grumman' s first plane, and
all it's successors went through the procurement process, which
can be briefly described. Typically the Navy's Bureau of Aero-
nautics informed the industry that it was going to hold a design
competition for a certain type of airplane. Those manufacturers
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interested drafted blueprints, submitting these along with the
projected performance of the design. From these the Bureau's Chief
of Designs and his staff recommended to the Bureau's Chief which
designs to cnoose. The number of designs picked to compete for
production varied, depending on the funding available, i.e., how
much Congress had appropriated, the quality of the designs sub-
mitted, and the degree of importance the type of airframe had in
the Navy. The Navy usually picked at least two. The manufacturers
chosen built experimental models to take part in a flying competi-
tion. After numerous tests conducted under the Navy's control were
completed, the results were assessed by the Bureau of Aeronautics
whose Chief decided which plane should go into mass production.
The manufacturer and the Navy Department then made a negotiated
contract on the number and the price of the airframes. The
Secretary of the Navy had the power to override any of the
decisions made, for each needed his approval. The fiavy paid for
the procured aircraft on a cash-on-de 1 i very (COD) basis.
The XFF-1 did not originate in this manner, for it did not
enter a design or flying competition. It's merits were based on
the comparison to existing aircraft. This was not the only case
where the Navy would test only the manufacturer's product, nor was
it collusive behavior. It was an indication however, that Grumman
was considered a viable manufacturer, and was given the benefit of
the doubt on it's ability to design promising airframes.
The decision to build carrier fighters and amphibians was
also important to the successful emergence of Grumman Aircraft.
Roy Grumman influenced these choices. It was no coincidence that
these were both the types he had worked on at the Naval Aircraft
Factory and with Loening. There were other reasons why management
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chose to construct carrier fighters. They realized that carrier
aviation would be growing in the future with the successful opera-
tions of the Lexington and Saratoga
,
and with more carriers in the
pipeline. Each carrier operated ninety plus aircraft, with addi-
tional squadrons training at various Naval Air Stations while the
carrier was at sea. With about a four to five year average service
life for naval aircraft during the 1930s, each carrier squadron
would change it's compliment of aircraft two or thre times during
the decade. Thus a carrier utilizing two air groups during the
year would need aproximately 600 aircraft during a decade.
Grumman officials may also have realized that with carrier
aviation still in it's infancy, no manufacturer would have a great
edge in experience or a lock on certain types of carrier aircraft.
The two companies building carrier fighters at this time, Boeing
and Curtiss, were both adapting land planes to use aboard the
floating airstrips. The new company likely felt it could provide
a fighter better suited to naval needs by designing it with this
in mind. It's management may also have learned through E.P. Ivarner
or another source that Boeing's long-term development plans were
in larger transport and bombers, leaving a vacancy that Grumman
could fill. Although these are specual t ions , each is a reasonable
possibility. There is no denying that Grumman 's entry coincides
with Boeing's withdrawal in building this type, but there is no
certainty of a connection.
After construction of the experimental Model A floats were
completed in the Spring of 1931, they were tested by the Navy at
Anacostia. The catapult launch was the severest test of the float,
but it passed easily. The Navy learned that despite the Model A's
weight, which was less than any float in service, even those with-
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out wheeled landing gear, it was as strong if not stronger than
any other. The Navy received it's first lesson that Grumman en-
gineers understood the strain that naval aircraft had to with-
stand, and built accordingly. The Havy ordered six of the Model As
at a unit price of $9,330. iu The Navy Department was impressed
with the landing gear implemented on the Model A. It asked Roy
when he visited .vashington, D.C. one week after the float contract
was signed if his undercarriage could be used on the Navy's cur-
rent fighter, the 3oeing K4B-4. He emphatically stated "No!",
noting the fuselage was much too slender for his gear. Roy did not
want to see his patent on any other fighter design but his
own .
Loening amphibian repair and the contract for the floats was
not enough to keep the shop force busy and was not bringing in
enough working capital, so engineers drafted plans for aluminum
truck bodies for Ted Lyon of Motor Haulage Trucking. Twenty-five
truck bodies and a number of chassisless trailers were built
during the Fall of 1331 (After .Vorld War II when aeronautical work
was in short supply, Grumman diversified into aluminum canoes and
fiberglass boats until it recovered it's market in military air-
craf t ) .
Grumman added to it's engineering corps during the first
year, allowing a greater amount of design work to be undertaken.
Tom Rae and Charley Miles joined the work force in the last half
of 1930. Rae was a former associate, having been employed at
Loening while studying engineering at New York University. In
January 1931 Charles Tilgner was hired. He had a good background
with a Master's Degree in civil engineering from Princeton, and
experience with two aircraft manufacturers, one of which was
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Loening. These three all worked on the modification of the float,
allowing Roy and Bill Schwendler to work on the first plane.
Additional draftsmen allowed the engineering staff to work in
teams on the projects undertaken. This decreased the mental errors
made, for others could catch the mistakes early. Grumman and
Schwendler dominated the staff during this period when engineer-
ing was so crucial to the establishment of the company as part of
t he i ndus t ry
.
Grumman ' s engineers worked dilligently to create a fighter
design having high performance, ruggedness, maintainability, and a
number of other contradictory factors. Aircraft carrier landing
and takeoff requirements were the first necessity to meet. Ameri-
can carrier tactics mandated a takeoff run of two hundred feet.
The.Navy used the deck-load strike to get the most aircrafts in the
air in the shortest time; therefore the lead airplanes had only
one fourth of the deck to get airborne. ..hen landing, carrier air-
craft needed unobstructed visibility to snag an arresting wire
stretched over the aft end of the flight deck. Carrier planes had
"beefed-up" landing gear and increased overall structural strength
compared to their land counterparts to absorb the punishment of
controlled stall landings and the jerk of the cable stopping the
craft. The carrier was operating independent of the battle fleet,
since it was vulnerable during an engagement. Operating alone, the
vessel needed the greatest number of planes possible to protect
itself, the battle line, and still attack the enemy. The iJavy,
therefore desired small airframes that would take up the least
amount of space on the carrier deck and hangar. The Mavy regarded
speed as extremely important, and was willing to sacrifice it only
as a last resort. Faster planes could outfight ones more manuver-
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able, being able to choose when to engage in combat and when to
flee. A high rate of climb and maneuverability ./ere other per-
1 9formance characteristics desired.
In three days after receiving a formal request for a bid on
the fighter from the Navy on 6 March 1931, Grumman submitted it's
new fighter bid quotation. This was unusually fast, indicating the
company had a pipeline in building this aircraft. The firm
guaranteed a fighter with 190 m.p.h. capability at sea level, a
landing speed below 66 m.p.h., and a climb rate of 12,000 feet in
ten minutes. It was to be powered by the new 575 h.p. Wright
Cyclone and a variable-pitch propeller (a prop whose bit could be
adjusted from the cockpit). This was one of the first uses of a
variable-pitch propeller, and a ten-year jump in front of the
British naval aircraft. 1 ^ Grumman increased the air flow around
this engine by using the new engine ring (early cowlings) designed
by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). The in-
ternal structure of the wing was also NACA's design. It had two
aluminum spars supporting the leading and trailing edges of the
wing, these being connected by ribs which were braced in an elon-
gated "N" fashion. The fabric covered wings were a staggered bi-
plane (the leading edge of the top wing ahead of the leading edge
of the bottom wing with an unequal span (top wing lower than the
bottom). The fuselage was to be a metal monocoque structure hous-
ing the patented landing gear, a first for naval fighters, neces-
sitating a deep belly giving the impression the plane was preg-
nant. Another first was the "coupe top", or canopy over the tandem
cockpit. The engineers' use of the latest technology can easily be
seen in the XFF-1 design. 14
At the time of the design, there was disagreement in the
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Navy's aeronautical establishment on the use of two-seat fighters.
This was by no means a ne.v discussion for such an argument had
occurred since the inception of the fighter. Some naval officers
supported the two-seater, believing the performance lost by the
additional seat was made up through increased armament with the
rear gun and improved navigation. Others felt better speed, climb,
and maneuverability were most important, and to compromise by un-
necessary characteristic was a mistake.
Despite the dispute, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics under
Admiral William Moffet's leadership ordered the XFF-1 on 2 April
1931, likely due to it's promised speed. Designs were sent to
Julie Holpit, head of Grumman's experimental shop, who supervised
the construction of a wooden mock-up. Each part was made of wood
and fitted together to insure the blueprints represented a work-
able
,
three dimensional airframe. When the design was proven ten-
able, the experimental shop began building the actual aluminum-
framed model. The Bureau of Aeronautics asked the company to
design it's own rear-seat gun guidance system and submit it to
Commander Webster, for the Navy was experiencing difficulties in
finding a competent design.
Design teams were also working on the modification of the
Model A float which became known as the ..iodel B. During the Spring
the Navy ordered two experimental "B" floats at an average unit
cost of $12,960.16 These were constructed quickly, and then
handed over to the Navy for evaulation. Following these tests, the
Navy awarded Grumman a production contract for fifteen Model B
floats at a unit price of $5,6255. ' These floats were used on the
Vought 02U-3 Corsairs (See Photo 1.3). Management's plan was run-
ning smoothly.
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Source: Aero Digest
,
vol. 35, no.l, January 1940, pp. 49, 50.
With the float and experimental plane contracts, more space
was needed at the factory. On 4 November 1931 the corporation
moved into an old Naval Reserve Hangar at the Curtiss Airport in
Valley Stream, Long Island (See Photo 1.4). After settled in, pro-
duction began on the ...odel E floats and the XFF-1 was completed
(See Photo 1.5).
Photo 1.5:
Source: Aviat ion , vol. 36, no. 4 (April 1937).
On 20 December the XFF-1 began the first phase of testing
that service aircraft must endure, i.e., the contractor's demon-
stration. At this time test pilots could not be an employee of the
manufacturer, so civilian pilot William McAvoy's services were ob-
tained for this flight. After checking the ground handling charac-
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teristics of the XFF-1 during taxiing, ,v;cAvoy took off, but he
soon made a premature landing. An untightened oil cap had come off
and oil covered the windscreen. V.cAvoy soon returned to the air to
complete the flight test. He appraised the plane as a fine
machine, being stable yet responding well to controls. i.lcAvoy
reached 195 m.p.h. at sea level, and later naval testing showed a
speed of 201 m.p.h. Aviation historian Bill Gunston stated that
this speed was "faster than any aircraft in the Navy or, so far as
I can discover, any Air Force at that time." 1 ^
The XFF-1 's speed certainly outclassed the United States
Navy's prime fighter. The Boeing F4B-4 attained a maximum speed of
only 195 m.p.h. at 15,000 feet, and 169 m.p.h. at sea level, sig-
nificantly lower than Grumman's new plane. 20 It's 120 gallon
fuel tank provided a range of 800 miles, comparable to other
fighters. The United States Navy would continue to procure fight-
ers with this range throughout the decade, revealing that it did
not anticipate the long-range fighter escorts needed in the vast
Pacific. This shows that fleet defense would continue to be the
naval pursuit's main task, and that the Navy expected dueling
carriers to engage each other at smaller distances than actually
occurred in World aar II. Time to climb to 10,000 feet was approx-
imately ten minutes, somewhat below Grumman's guarantee and the
performance of current naval aircraft. A 23,600 feet service
ceiling was recorded, also slightly below standards of the day.
Despite these limitations, the overall performance of the XFF-1
was better than most single-seat fighters. It's deficiencies
started Grumman considering a single-seat pursuit.
The Navy then began it's testing, a phase that took some time
(one year for the XFF-1). Aircraft were put through numerous tests
2L,
at Anacostia. Pilots reports were written and critical inspections
were made, listing any recommendations for changes or modifica-
tions, after each flight. The data from these reports was evaluat-
ed by the officials in the Navy Department before making the
decision whether to purchase production units. '* Grumman
anxiously waited the verdict.
During the Spring of 1932, the engineering department worked
on the modification of the XFF-1 into a scout (XSF-1) and an
amphibian design joining the fuselage of the Ff-1 with the Model
B float (XJF-1). Grumman and Schwendler headed these tasks, .foy
enjoyed drafting more than his presidential duties, helping to
give the impression that Swirbul did most of the wheeling and
deal ins
.
By June the Model D floats, practically the only production
order worked on during the year, had long been completed. This
left the shop force without much work, but the experimental team
soon became busy, for on 9 June 1932 the Navy exercised their op-
tion for the scout version of the FF-1. The SF-1 v/as to have an
increased range over the FF-1, but would lose some of it's arma-
ment. The SF-1 was Grumman ' s only experimental order in fiscal
year 1932.
Despite these contracts, the financial picture was not good
during the Summer of 1932. With no production orders, Grumman laid
off it's workers for two weeks. When they returned the engineering
staff worked on the single-seat fighter started after the XFF-l's
deficiencies were revealed.
Work was also continued on the amphibian's blueprints. Jack
Neady, a former engineer at Loening who had moved to Bristol
during the Keystone merger, joined Gruudr.an. His specialty was
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hydrodynamics, so he had been made chief draftsman of the XJF-1
project. In August 1932 the Navy ordered an experimental amphi-
bian, needing an aircraft for target towing; aerial survey; aerial
photography; rescue; and various other functions which could take-
off on land, sea, or a carrier's deck. Gruir.man's design looked
promi sing.
One can see the company's previous designs in the XJF-1.
Grumman engineers used similar features to assist in the produc-
tion of each successive design. The fuselage, engine ring, and
cockpit were similar to the XFF-1. The wings were a stagger bi-
plane connected with "N" type struts, but this time of equal span.
The fabric-covered wings internal construction consisted of dual
spars with "N" type braced ribs (See Diagram A. 3). The fuselage
and float were mated with external skin making them look like one
structure. Grumman increased the top heaviness of it's engineer-
ing corps when Richard Hutton joined the work force. He had worked
in Loening's siiop after graduating from high school, joining
Grumman' s shop force at Baldwin while taking night courses in
drafting and engineering at Pratt Institute in New York. He moved
Diagram A. 3:
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Source: "Grumman Utility," Aviat ion , Dec. 1934, p. 302.
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up in position when he completed this course. Historian David
Anderson called Hutton "th brilliant young designer of so many of
22Grumman's aircraft..." His major contribution came with the
Hellcat nearly a decade later, however his and Neady's hiring be-
fore gaining a production contract shows the company's dedication
to the team design concept.
The XSf-1 flew for the first time on 20 August 1932. The
manufacturer's flight showed a top speed of 207 m.p.h. with it's
700 n.p. wright Cyclone. It's range was 1,100 miles, 300 miles
better than the XFF-1. The Navy took over the tests with the de-
livery of the plane to Anacostia.
While keeping abreast of the Navy's testing of the XSF-1, the
experimental shop worked on the amphibian and the engineering de-
partment completed it's draft of the single-seat fighter. On 2 No-
vember the bureau of Aeronautics asked for a XF2F-1. The biplane
fignter was smaller than the XFF-1, yet it housed a more powerful
engine (Pratt 8 Whitney 625 h.p. XR-1535-44) giving it increased
performance. Better aerodynamic efficiency was gained through the
use of MACA's new cowling which surrounded the engine. This was
the first use of a two-row radial engine in a fighter, allowing a
smaller fuselage design. This was also the first single-seat naval
fighter with an enclosed cockpit. The XF2F-1 incorporated
G r uiiiiiia n
'
s patented undercarriage, which created another fat-belli-
ed, metal-skin, monocoque fuselage. A fabric-covered NACA airfoil
in a staggered, unequal span structure extended outward from the
airframe
' s body.
Grumman moved into it's third factory in it's third year of
existence in November 1932. The plant was located in Farmi ngdal e
,
again on Long Long Island. Originally built for a trucking firm,
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Photo 1.6:
it had just previously been
home to American Airplane
and Engine Company. Adjacent
to the plant was a larger
grass airfield.
Good news came quickly
after the move to Farmingdale.
Source : Aero Pi Jes
t
, Jan.
1940, p. 51.
In the middle of December the first production order arrived from
the Navy Department for twenty-seven FF-ls. The average price per
2 1plane was 319,000. This was the beginning of management's last
step to establish a permanent foothold as a naval aircraft suppli-
er, for once a production contract was completed, it was believed
the Mavy's confidence in the new firm would be confirmed.
The contract caused the shop force to expand rapidly from the
previous forty-two workers. Experienced and skilled craftsmen were
obtained since most aircraft corporations were decreasing their
work force due to the financial pinch caused by the Depression.
These men were hired to perform the numerous tasks required to
construct an airframe. Benchhands prefabricated various parts,
their work being apportioned by a dispatcher. Sheet metal workers
cut, formed, and hardened metal by heat or chemical solution. ,\ien
operated drill presses, grinders, lathes, milling machines, saws,
punch presses, and routing machines, while others were assigned as
welders, riveters, bucker uppers, coverers (those working with
fabric), armorers, electricians, etc. Assemblers constructed dif-
ferent sections such as wings, fuselage, fin and rudder, and sta-
bilizers; and then joined them into one airframe.
Early in 1933 the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered twenty-seven
2S
machine gun mountings to be placed into the FF-1. The engineers
made the gun and chair swivel together with manpower guiding the
system. Each gun mount was priced at $150." Grumman's simplicity
of design had come through when other turret designs failed. The
engineers again proved their ability.
While the assembly line began producing the FF-1, Holpit's
experimental team completed the amphibious XJF-1 "Duck". It con-
ducted it's .manufacturing test flight on L, ..lay piloted by Paul
Hovgard. The 700 h.p. Pratt & Whitney provided enough power to
reach 165 m.p.h. It's overall flight characteristics were viewed
as acceptable, so the Navy took charge of testing after delivery
to Anacos t ia
.
In the Spring of 1933 FF-ls began rolling off the assembly line,
with deliveries to Fighter Squadron VF-5V of the U.S.S. Lexington
beginning on 21 June. Approximately five were delivered each month
until the order was completed in November. The performance of the
production aircraft had been increased with the use of a 755 h.p.
Wright Cyclone and a larger propeller. Speed rose to 220 m.p.h. at
7,000 feet, and 10,000 feet could now be reached in seven minutes.
A ten-gallon increase in fuel capacity extended it's range to S60
miles. Naval aviation historian Theodore Roscoe thought highly
of this plane, stating; "Perhaps the best carrier plane produced
in the first half of the 1930s was the stubby little Grumman
'Ft Fi ' (as the FF-1 was affectionately called by the pilots)."*'
Although the fighter performed it's tasks admirably it was the
two-seat pursuit used in the interwar period. The Navy realized,
through the application of the FF-1 ' s successors from Grumman,
that single-seat fighters could establish air superiority, desired
in naval theory on fleet air defense, better than the two-seater.
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While the FF-1 production was in full swing, Julie iiolpit
supervised the construction of the latest fighter, the XF2F-1. It
recorded it's first flight on IS October 1933 with Jimmy Collins
at the controls. He noted that it was fast, maneuverabl e , rugged,
and a little touchy during takeoffs and landings. This initial
test and the subsequent naval tests showed the maximum speed to be
220 m.p.h., yet it still had a slow landing speed of 66 m.p.h. It
registered an initial rate of climb of 3000 feet per minute, drop-
ping off to 2,200 feet after losing it's forward momentum. The
XF2F-1 ascended to a ceiling of 29,000 feet, .v'ith it's combination
of speed, climb, maneuverability, and small size, the XF2F-1 seem-
ed perfect for carrier duty during this period.
Although production of the FF-1 ended in November, the
assembly line was not idle for the Navy ordered thirty-four SF-ls
on It December. The corporation originally priced the contract at
just under $800,000, however a Navy "Fair i'rice Audit" reduced
this sum considerably. The cost of each plane was lowered from
$19,000 to $16,000. The total price now equalled iob'7,260, saving
the Navy Department $62,000. 2 y Thirty-four $150 flexible gun
mounts were also ordered. 30 Now that Grumman was gaining working
capital, it was not going to be given as free a hand to set
slightly "inflated" prices. Although it appears that the Navy De-
partment gave the company slightly preferential treatment during
it's first years, allowing it to make a profit on experimental
orders when other manufacturers could not, this was only to allow
the firm to function until an economy of scale could allow profits
to be made, i.e. until production had grown large enough to make
financial gain possible. The Navy could not afford to allow any
manufacturer to make a high profit on a contract, for accusations
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of profiteering and scandal had led to a Congressional hearing
(Delaney Hearings) which was currently investigating the practices
of the aircraft industry. Sad press would not help the growth of
naval aviation.
During the first few years of Grumman's existence there was
active opposition to the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, a
cross-licensing agreement formed in July 1917 under pressure from
the government which desired mass production utilizing all the
latest aeronautical developments. The government saw the pool as
the best arrangement to meet the needs of .Vorld War I. It aided in
the concentration of the industry by allowing the selected com-
panies of the patent pool to use all the latest developments, thus
giving them better chances to gain orders than those outside the
pool. Those uninvolved called for it's dissolution after the war,
but it continued to function. The Hoover administration expressed
the virtue of laissez-faire capitalism, however it did not oppose
voluntary cooperation among businesses and the government. The
companies connected with the "Air Trust", primarily the sub-
sidiaries of United Aircraft & Transport and the Cur t
i
ss-Wright
Corporation, had grown substantially, and the government supported
big business. Such growth was viewed as economically beneficial to
the country. If the companies of the Air Trust could provide
better airplanes, then this would reduce foreign imports. These
companies also utilized lobbyists to aid in obtaining contracts.
The Depression, combined with accusations of profiteering and
claims that United States military aircraft were inferior to
foreign airplanes, caused the government to listen more closely to
the opposition of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association. From
1933 to 1935 three Congressional investigations looked at the
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practices of the aircraft industry. The most important from the
naval standpoint was the House of Representative's Naval Affairs
subcommittee on Aeronautics hearings concerning naval aircraft
manufacturers. Congressman John Delaney of New York presided,
hence the investigation has been called the Delaney Hearings. The
Senate's inquiry of the munitions industry included a section ex-
amining the aircraft industry. North Dakota Senator Gerald ?. Nye
chaired the comittee which ca.ne to conclusions similar to the
Delaney Hearings. The third hearing concerning aeronautical
practices was held by the House Committee on Patents, which in-
vestigated the .Manufacturers Aircraft Association.
Among the most vocal of the independent aircraft enterpre-
neurs to oppose the Air Trust was James Martin, president of the
Martin Aircraft Factory (not to be confused with Glenn .Martin,
whose company was part of the MAA). He believed the pool "made it
impossible for an ^independent] invent er ... to get his device
into operation... for the MAAJ managed that it's adoption is
arranged for their benefit..." J Martin claimed eight to twenty-
two patents on all modern aircraft, yet he never received any form
of royalty. He maintained his aircraft designs were greatly
superior to others, yet he was unable to gain contracts because of
the Air Trust. He designed a fighter capable of 212 m.p.h. for the
Navy, but Jerome Hunsaker, a Curtiss Company "air-trust agent"
held a commanding position in the Navy service and had prevented
tests in our \U . S . /NACA' sj laboratories of my design." Curtiss
received the contract with a plane 60 m.p.h. slower. 32 Martin also
claimed to be able to build a bomber with a range of nine thousand
mi les (without it's bomb load), compared to the one thousand mile
range of contemporary United States Army Air Corps bombers. Such a
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preposterous figure illuminates one reason why Martin could not
obtain orders. Martin blamed the Air Trust, claiming General
Pratt, Chief of the procurement section of the Air Corps in Day-
ton, Ohio told him, "You cannot get a contract. The Air Corps'
policy is to keep all the business in the Curtlss-Wright Company,
and their associates, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association in-
terests, and it would be futile and a waste of time to try to get
any cont rac t s . "33
.Martin regarded the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics as a "tool of the Air Trust," with men such as Dr. Ames of
John Hopkins (chairman of NACA), E.P. Warner, and others involved
in both organizations. lie called NACA a "bribe committee." Roy
Knabenshue, an expert on 1 igh t er-t han-ai r aircraft, agreed with
Martin believing NACA was an instrument utilized by the large air-
craft manufacturers to get ahold of new concepts and innovations
made by independent inventors. He believed NACA's cowling was a
copy of his invention devised to be used in front of blimps for
reducing wind resistance.
Former Brigadier General Billy Mitchell of the United States
Army Air Corps also considered the Air Trust as a menace. He be-
lieved it lessened the competitive atmosphere of the industry, re-
sulting ultimately in the degrading of America's military capabil-
ities. He felt aircraft would play a major role in a future war;
however with the practices of the MAA the United States was not
getting the best possible aircraft.
LeRoy Grumman's testimony during the Delaney Hearings pre-
sented an alternative view toward the relationship of the Manu-
facturers Aircraft Association and the inability of non-members to
gain contracts or patents. Prior to the congressional inquiry, Roy
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stated he did not even know the Air Trust existed, which seems in-
credible. Taken on face value, his ignorance stemmed from the high
degree of engineering work he undertook and the lack of publicity
of the S1AA. Grumman noted that even though his company was not
part of a large holding company, it was able to obtain business
from the government. It also had no problem gaining patents, sucn
as the retractable landing gear. 35 Roy did not attribute any rea-
son for his company's success in receiving good treatment from the
Navy and NACA. Again his acquaintance with E.P. Warner aided the
company's relations with both governmental divisions, since ..arner
was involved in both areas. The small size of the naval air ser-
vice community assured the Bureau of Aeronautics was conscious of
the ability of Grumman's personnel, and was no stranger to it's
president
.
The growth of carrier aviation was also responsible for the
Navy's conduct, for a manufacturer that worked primarily in this
area was needed. The carrier Ranger was nearing completion in
1933, and would be commissioned the following year. During the
Summer OF 1533 The National Industrial Recovery Act authorized the
construction of two more carriers which became the Yorktown and
Enterprise ( CV Nos. 5 and 6).
Another reason for Grumman's success with the Navy was it's
willingness to work within the Navy's guidelines. It took the
Navy's stance om many of the issues of the procurement process and
did not make waves when it disagreed. One of the concerns raised,
primarily by those who could not break into the military market,
was competitive bidding. Billy Mitchelll opposed negotiated con-
tracts in military aircraft procurement, which were the rule
rather than the exception. he believed aeronautical equipment
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should be bought after three competitions— in design, flying, and
price— rather than the current system which used only the first
two. .Mitchell also suggested the government consider building more
of it's own aircraft since it could do so cheaper than private
manufacturers. To prove his point, he pointed out the Naval Air-
craft Factory in Philadelphia had constructed airframes for 15-20%
less than builders in the private sector. Rear Admiral Ernest J.
King, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (replacement for Admiral
William ..:offet after his death in the crash of the rigid airship
Akron in 1933) disputed this view, believing it cost the govern-
ment more to build aircraft at the Naval Aircraft Factory, giving
the XT2N-1 as an example. This single-engine experimental trainer
cost $71,030 (comparable to Grumman's combat aircraft), but this
price did not include price depreciation, maintenance, engineering
and office salaries which the private sector prorated into it's
cost. 36
Unlike General Mitchell, Koy opposed competitive bidding for
production contracts on a design already accepted. lie adopted the
Navy's position, believing it wasted too much time and further de-
layed the drawn out procurement process. The lengthening of pro-
curement would provide airframes that were more obsolescent upon
delivery. Grumman believed a negotiated contract could be made in
less time, and would provide the military service with superior
construction. His feelings were exemplified in his reply to Con-
gressman W.D. McFarlane of Texas who asked if another manufacturer
could do as good a job building a Grumman design. Roy stated, "Not
with our airplane....! think the person who develops the airplane
is best qualified to build it."° 7 He expanded on this thought,
believing that if a design was manufactured by another company,
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they might try to cut costs and cheapen the quality of the plane.
They might also find problems in the design, yet still build them
into the aircraft since they were not responsible for the original
blueprint. Grumman believed pride was a strong motivator for manu-
facturers, and should not be taken away by allowing another firm
to build it's airframes. Grumman also realized that such a policy
could have been harmful to his company wnich had a number of de-
signs but had yet to gain many production contracts.
Aircraft Manufacturers were interested in cost-plus con-
tracts, of which there were two types, that insured profits. One
type was cost plus a percentage of profit, in which the con-
tractor's costs were paid along with a percentage of the total
costs. The government was especially leery of this type, for it
was to the advantage of the manufacturer to drive up costs in any
way in order to make a greater profit. These efforts to drive up
costs would likely take the form of delays, which would create
more obselete aircraft reaching the services. The second type was
a cost-plus-fee contract. The government paid the costs plus a
pre-de t ermined bonus negotiated between t lie manufacturer and the
service. Although Grumman supported the idea of cost-plus con-
tracts, he was not strongly opposed to fixed-fee ordering. The
Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics favored fixed-fee contracts and was
opposed to any change. It could not afford an increase in costs
.for appropriations were declining. With accusations of profiteer-
ing by it's suppliers, the Navy could ill afford more negative
publicity for it's aircraft procuring process. To initiate the use
of cost-plus contracts would be throwing fuel on a nearly uncon-
trollable fire. Negotiated fixed price contracts continued to be
issued throughout the 1930s. 33
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The growth Grumman Aircraft experienced in it's first four
years was remarkable. Personnel expanded from twenty-three in 1930
to two hundred and seven in 1933.39 Financial ly, Grumman made
steady annual progress, with a good leap upward in 1933 when it
completed the FF-1 production order. Annual sales grew from
$109,000 in 1930 to $684,100 in 1933. Annual gross income rose
from $109,000 in 1930 to $6S3,000 in 1933. i0 During the same four
year period naval aircraft expenditures were cut in half and air-
craft industry production fell from $48,530,715 in 1931 to
$33,347,122 in 1933. U (See Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 for total
financial picture; see also Appendix 3).
Table 1.2 : Grumman ' s Finances
Y Sales Annual Annual Aircraft Grumman '
s
E Gross Met Industry % of in-
A Income Profits Production dustry pro-
^ duct i on
1930 $109,000 $109,000 $ 5,476 $ - - - - -
1931 $256,971 $146,000 $ 4,456 $48,539,715 0.334
1932 $250,333 $276,000 $ 44,371 $34,861,158 0. Sri
1933 $862,000 $647,000 $133,676 $33,357,122 2.6%
Table 1.3 : Grumman's Sales to Navy Expenditures
V Sales % Naval %
E U.S. Aircraft Grumman
A Navy Expenditures
R
1930 $109,000 31% $14,245,000 0.2SS
1931 $256,971 80% $12,199,000 1.0%
1932 $250,333 89% $ 8,715,000 2.3%
1933 $862,600 100% $ 7,203,000 12.0%
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Sources used to compile Table 1.2 and 1.3:
Delanev Hearings
, pp. 466, 632-633. Threulsen, The Grunman Story
,
p. &$. E. E. Feudenthal, "The Aviation Business in the 1930s,"
p. 105. "Naval Aircraft Expenditures 1920-1939," Concession
Record
, pp. 727-723. '
The company's ability to expand while funding for naval air-
craft dropped and industrial production decreases made it's
initial success more spectular.
The two tables reveal Grumman '8 financial growth and it's re-
liance on the United States Navy. Only 5153,492 of the firm's
sales were in the commercial market, on which a 4% profit was
made. Compared to the $17 million made in commercial sales by the
nine .major naval aircraft manufacturers between 1927 and 1933, or
just Boeing's $7 million, Grumman's figure was miniscule.^ This in-
come came from truck production and Loenins repair, not from
actual airframe production.
Table 1.4 :
United States Navy
Production Contracts Experimental Contracts
Sales Cost +/- Sales Cos t +/-
Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp. S234.43S S210,lo4 +11^ S217.757 $154
, 763 +40',;
Source: Delaney Hearings
,
Navy Table, p. 502.
Every aircraft sold by Grumman during the first four years
went to the Navy. The corporation's sales were 1.2% of the Navy's
aircraft expenditures. A 11% profit was made on it's production
contracts, and profits made in the experimental area totalled 40%.
This was another indication that the Navy was willing to subsi-
dize Grumman while it attempted to get established, for naval air-
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craft manufacturer were averaging a 34% loss in experimental con-
tracts. J Reflecting the fact that Gru.T.rr.an was just beginning op-
erations, 2,8% of it's naval contracts (in monetary value) were ex-
perimental, t.'o other company came close to having so much at stake
in this area. Consolidated was second in line at 15%. and the
average was 4.9%. There was past evidence that the military was
willing to assist fledgling companies, for Pratt & Whitney, an
engine manufacturer, also made high profits in the first few years
after it began operation in 1926. Grumman needed profits on it's
experimental contracts during these early years to survive, yet
the Navy may not have expected the manufacturer to make the per-
centage it did. It must be noted that there were no major delays
or problems in the building and flight testing of the floats or
first four experimental aircraft. The Navy may have included a
little extra in case setbacks had been encountered, but the en-
gineering and construction efforts proved up to the tasks at hand.
When lloy Grumman was asked about the positive profits on experi-
mental contracts, he replied, "1 think our company is a little
more efficient on experimental work due to our small size."^
while that may have been part of the explanation, preferential
treatment by the Navy also played a part.
One may wonder why the Navy was willing partially to sub-
sidize Grumman Aircraft? Evidence points towards the Navy's desire
to be supplied by manufacturers who gave them first priority. The
two biggest producers of naval airplanes at this time were the
Glenn Martin and Chance Vought Corporation, with S9,S95,605 and
$6, 469,134 in naval sales between 1927 and 1933, respectively.
Neither of these two conducted any business with the Army Air
Corps during this period, and only Chance Vought made any com-
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mercial sales (25%). It was likely no coincidence that Grumman
picked as it's major product a type that would not have to compete
initially with aircraft from these companies. The void left by the
merger of Loening with Keystone, and the increasing need for
carrier aircraft also added to the Navy's desire for a manufactur-
er that built similar types that Loening had built and the types
needed by carriers, i.e. fighters and amphibians.
Grumman Aircraft was by no means in a commanding position at
the end of it's four years, but it had made some good strides. Ex-
pansion had come despite the odds that were faced. These had been
surmounted by planning, sound decision making, the use of the most
modern engineering concepts without forgetting maritime require-
ments, and a product complimentary to the needs of the Navy.
Grumman now looked to the future, with Rear Admiral Ernest J.
King, Chief of the 3ureau of Aeronautics (CNO during world >iar 11)
specifically including it on a list of three naval airframe
manuf ac turers that he expected to be working with the Navy in
AScoming years.
King of the Biplane Fighters, Grumman Aircraft 1934-3b'
Part II
Now that Grumman Aircraft had established itself as a capable
naval aircraft manufacturer, it hoped to witness corporate growth.
It's desires came true, for from 1934 to 1336 it's gross income
qaudrupled, with a steady rise each year. The reasons for it's
financial prosperity during these five years were sin.ilar to that
seen in the first four years. The engineer's work from the forma-
tive period continued to pay dividends, as did some of their
drafting between 1934 to 193S; however there were some disappoint-
ments in the engineering department as well. Production became a
central concern, so new designs came out at a slower pace than in
the period before or following Grumman's reign as the naval bi-
plane fighter King. The price per pound of Grumman aircraft de-
creased during this period. The growth of carrier aviation and the
Navy's slowness to adopt monoplanes also continued to assist the
company's rise. Orders placed for Grumman aircraft by purchasers
other than the Navy also improved the company's financial stand-
i no .
At the beginning of 1934 construction continued on the
thirty-four SF-ls and the design of the XF3F. The management stay-
ed well informed on the progress of the Navy's testing of the
XJF-1 and the XF2F-1 , hoping to obtain production orders in the
future. Besides the time spent at the Navy Department and the
testing area at Anacostia, Soy had to spend some extra time in
Washington during February 1934. He testified at the hearine be-
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fore the House of Representatives' subcommittee on aeronautics,
which were investigating the practice of aircraft manufacturers,
otherwise known as the Delaney Hearings (See Part I).
while Hoy was involved with the inquiry, the Navy ordered
twenty-seven JF-1 "Ducks", the first order for these utility air-
craft. Powered by a 700 h.p. Pratt S Whitney, it had a capacity of
four with two in the tandem cockpit and accomodations for tjo more
in the hull, and an "unusually extensive coiiiplemen t of radio and
photographic equipment.''' The latter was complementary to the
roles of air search and rescue, reconnaissance, gunnery spotting,
and patrolling to be performed by the amphibian. The JF-l's
average price was $21,000.*°
The design work from it's first four years continued to pay
off. V/hile the XF2F-1 was being put together tests at Anacostia,
Grumman extrolled the virtues of the aircraft to persuade the Navy
Department into awarding his company another production order. ile
noted the small size, performance, and handling capabilities were
ideal for carrier operations. The retractable undercarriage, which
included the tailwheel assembly and arresting hook, was improved
over earlier models.
On 17 March 1934 the diligence paid off, for a production
order came for fifty-four F2F-ls, the largest single order for
aircraft by the Navy up to this time. Evidently the Navy was aware
of the virtues of Grumman's airplane. The total contract came to
just under $1 million for airframes, parts, and drawing and in-
formation. Grumman now had three assembly lines at the Farming-
dale factory throughout most of 1934. Production efforts moved to
the forefront of Grumman's activities.
Legislation in 1934 had an impact on naval aircraft
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suppliers. The aircraft industry had reached it's low point in
1S33 due to the slow commercial sales caused by the Depression
and the end of the military's five year plans. The Baker Board
looked into the problem, resulting in new five year aircraft pro-
curement plans for the services beginning in 1335. i.,ore legisla-
tion came in the form of the Vinson-Tramme 1 1 Act which passed in
••.arch 1934. It increased the authorization for aircraft to be pur-
chased by the Navy, more than doubling the previous one thousand
plane navy. This expansion was to be completed by 1940. These
planes *ere necessary to fill the decks of the aircraft carriers
authorized by the Act, and those already being built. It also
limited contractors to 10% profit of it's airframes and engines.
The politics behind the Vinson-Tramme 1 Act were threefold.
One purpose was to warn the Japanese the United States did not
approve of it's terrorism in ...anchuria or it's announcement it no
longer adherred to the 5:5:3 tonnage requirements of the Washing-
ton and London Naval Treaties (one year advance notification re-
quired by treaty). Another reason for the legislation was to aid
the economic situation of the United States by providing jobs in
the shipbuilding industry. A third purpose was to eliminate pro-
fiteering, or the fear of profiteering, recently discussed in the
Nye and Delaney inquiries.
On 30 .viarch 1934 Grumman began deliveries of the SF-1 to the
United States Navy. Scouting Squadron VS-3B of the Lexington re-
ceived the aircraft, putting the FF-ls and SF-ls aboard the same
carrier. Grumman airplanes now formed more than half of the
vessel's air group. Aviation historian Bill Gunston stated, "The
serviceability and toughness of these aircraft earned the company
a reputation it has jealously guarded. "->° At the end of fiscal
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year 1934 (year ending 30 June 1934), Secretary of the .'Javy Claude
Swanson stated that the "past year had witnessed placing in ser-
vice carrier planes of marked increase in performance." 31 He was
in part describing the introduction of the FF-1 and SF-1 to active
front line service.
While both of these aircraft performed admirably, each was the
last of a breed. The FF-1 was the last two-seat fighter used by
the Wavy until night-fighters showed up in World war II, and the
very last to have an aft machine gun (the large twin-engined F-61
lilack Widow night-fighter may be an exception since it had a top
turret, however it was usually locked in the forward position to
complement it's other guns). The single-seat fighters from Grumman
that succeeded it proved to the Navy that they were superior in
gaining command of the air over tne fleet. The SF-1 was the last
of the scout-fighters; for as the carrier turned more to the role
of attack and the need for increased range in scouts was needed to
offset the dramatic increase in range of shore-basea patrol
planes, scouting duties were performed by bombers. Douglas'
Dauntless' dive bombers were performing this role when the war
broke out in the Facific in 1941.
In October 1934 the Navy accepted the design proposals of the
XF3F-1 which had recently been submitted to Commander Royce, the
new chief of Designs in the Bureau of Aeronautics for a price of
£75,840 (nearly S20.000 cheaper than XF2F-1). Grumman' s XF3F-1
fighter prototype was it's third pursuit, and fourth consecutive
design purchased by the Navy. It's dimensions had been increased
over the F2F to improve it's maneuverability compared to it's an-
cestor. (See Appendix 2). The F3F was the company's biggest sell-
ing product during the 1930s. It was also the last biplane used by
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the Navy.
The JF-1 production line was augmented by an order from the Coast
Guard for fifteen utility amphibians in July 1934. Special equip-
ment was added along with the 700 h.p. '..'right Cyclone; therefore
the Coast Guard's Ducks were designated JF-2. On 21 December 1934
one of these JF-2s piloted by Commander E. F. Stone establisned
a new world record for amphibians. lie broke \iajor Alexander de
Seversky's (who flew a Seversky amphibian) 9 October 1933 record
of 176.76 m.p.h. Stone's new mark v/as 191. C m.p.h.
The beginning of 1935 saw the start of deliveries of the
F2F-ls to the i-iavy. Production models reached 231 m.p.h. at 7,500
feet and 205 m.p.h. at sea level. It had an initial rate of climb
of 3,000 ft./min., and could reach 10,000 feet in four minutes and
forty-two seconds. At 210 m.p.h. cruising speed, the F2F had a
range of 750 miles, but at one-quarter throttle it could squeeze
out 900 miles. The cockpit enclosure was enlarged and modified on
the production order for more pilot comfort. The NACA cowling had
been re-designed to provide increased aerodynamic efficiency
around the two-row Pratt & Whitney engine. Matt and Robertson,
historians of naval fighters, stated that the F2F was "easily
serviced," and it's rugged construction allowed "violent
maneuvers" without causing "strain on the aircraft. The Navy was
concerned with the F2F's tendency to spin and it's directional
instability, good qualities for quick maneuvering, but poor for
landing and long flights over water where vertigo was a problem.
F2Fs were delivered to the U.S.S. Lexington and the newly com-
missioned U.S.S. Ranker
. Ranger ' s F2F squadrons later were
used by the carriers Wasp and Yorlctown until replaced by F3Fs in
1939. VF-7 aboard the Lexington would operate F2Fs until June
£5
1940, giving these aircraft a front line service life of five and
one naif years, which was above average for the 1930s. ^*
From the perspecitve of today's aerospace industry 5 1/2
years would he an extremely short life. McDonnell's F-i Phantom
has served for over twenty years as f i gh t er-bomber
,
yet it still
compromises a large percentage of modern air forces and can com-
pete with newer aircraft. Grumman's own F-14 Tomcat has been a
carrier fighter for more than a decade, yet it will be the Navy's
elite interceptor on into the iy90s. In the 1950s service lives of
airframes were much shorter, with naval fighters averaging four
years .
The reasons for the changing life-spans of the 1930s to tnat
in the jet age have been the increasing investment in design and
testing aircraft and the change in the emphasis on performance.
The cost of designing and testing combat aircraft today can only
be undertaken by large corporations with huge reserves of capital
for the length of the design phase has increased, but more im-
portantly tiie amount of technical equipment such as radars, com-
puters, and complex missile systems has caused the rise in costs.
Such systems have been the major technological advancement in the
last two decades, whereas in the 1930s technical development pro-
vided improved strength and better performance. Airframe construc-
tion was changing from wood frames and canvas coverings to alumin-
um frames and skins. The Boeing F4E initially had wooden wings,
whereas Grumman always used aluminum construction. iioy Grumman
noted in 193d that 90% of the weight of his aircraft was alumin-
um. - Speed and climb spiraled upward at a tremendous rate with
improved metallurgy, a better understanding of aerodynamics, and
the increasing horsepower of engines.
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Gruinman received more orders from the N'avy for the utility
amphibians on 12 February 1935. Eleven JF-ls plus parts were pur-
chased for an average of 520, S44. 30 The amphibian's price had not
been increased.
By .V.arch the XF3F-1 was ready for initial testing. The plane
improved the compact cockpit, directional unsteadiness and the
proneness to enter an unwanted spin that it's predecessor (the
F2F) suffered. It was soon discovered that the XF3F-1 had troubles
of it's own. Tragedy struck on 22 ;.iarch when Jimmy Collins was
killed in the crash of the experimental plane while conducting the
terminal velocity dive test (diving straight down from a high
altitude, reaching the highest speed possible, and then pulling
out of the dive). As shown in .varner Lirothers' 1930 movie "ivings
of the N'avy", this test *as one of the severest of experimental
airframes. The XF3F-1 was supposed to encounter nine "C-s"
(the force of gravity) in it's pullout, however the recorder re-
covered from the wreck showed the stress was actually fourteen
Gs. The plane had encountered the problem of high compression,
a menace just beginning to be understood by leading aerodynamic
theore t icians
.
The 3ureau of Aeronautics purchased a second experimental
model with reinforced fittings and engine mount. It successfully
completed tests at Farmingdale, and was delivered to Anacostia in
May. A second setback was suffered in the XF3F-l's trials when
naval pilot Lee Gelbach was forced to bail out after losing con-
trol of the prototype in a spin. After the crash Chief Engineer
Bill Schwendler took a model of the design to NACA's new spin
tunnel at Langley Field. After numerous tests, the problem was
solved by adding a small fin below the fin and rudder. NACA's spin
tunnel saved Grumman from losing a contract for the Dureau of
Aeronautics were still interested in procuring production F3Fs.
Julie liolpit's crew refitted the Celbach wreck in less than one
month, turning it over to the Navy on 20 June so testing could
cont inue . '°
In late ,.iay or early June GruiruT.an entered a flight competi-
tion with Chance Vought after these two were awarded contracts for
their experimental scout-bombers. Grumman' s plane was an improved
version of the SF-1, with better aerodynamics and a bigger engine,
iiolpit and his fellow workers began working on the new bomber,
designated XSBF-1, and would have it ready for flight tests in
eight months. For the first time Grumman had moved away from the
fighter or amphibian area, but the end result was not encouraging.
Grumman received more orders from the Navy in June. On the
2yth the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered twenty-nine JF-2 amphi-
bians. These amphibians were basically the JF-1 except they housed
a more powerful 330 h.p. Pratt £ Whitney, thus causing a slight
change in designation. These Ducks averaged $23,337, only a modest
increase due to the modifications made. It was simple to see
that the Navy was pleased with the capabilities of the Ducks by
it's continual purchases. In the last two years it had procured
sixty-seven utilities from Grumman (not including the fifteen or-
dered by the Coast Guard). This was 62.75; more than the Navy had
on hand prior to the Vi nson-Tramme 1 Act. 01 At the end of fiscal
year 1935 the Navy's arsenal consisted of nine hundred and
seventy-four service aircraft with four hundred and seventy-two on
order. * Grumman placed one hundred and eighty-two airframes on
these lists, equalling 12.6% of all naval aircraft on hand or on
48
order.
Grumman's J2F-1 Utility
Source: Jane's All The v.orlc's Aircraft
,
193c, p. 270c.
August 1935 started out on a bleak note when a hail storm
obliterated the glass skylights of the Farmingdale factory, but
the despairing problems soon gave way to encouraging news. On 24
August the Navy ordered fifty-four F3F-ls. The F3F-1 won a flight
competition against an airframe from Curtiss Aeroplane 8 Motor of
Liuffalo, Mew York. Curtiss' bid was the lowest at $1,067,344, but
Grumman's SI, 082, 965 bid gained the order with Secretary of the
Navy Claude Svanson using his power to award contracts to the low-
est respons i bl
e
bidder. Curtiss dealt with the Air Corps more
than the Navy, having obtained nearly twice the amount in sales
from the Army from 1927 to 1933. It's planes were adaptations of
land planes, so did not put naval need first. In case of war, the
Navy realized that the Army's orders would be placed ahead of it's
purchases. Another consideration was the Navy's experience with
the 13F2C fighters recently built by Curtiss for carrier duty.
These fighters only lasted a few months before having to be taken
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out of service after suffering numerous accidents caused by faulty
retractable landing gear. This made Grumman a more reliable manu-
facturer. It's prototype also proved to have a better maximum
speed and other performance characteristics.
During 1935 the design team led by Chief Engineer Schwendler
had been working on yet another new biplane fighter, the XF4F-1.
Cn 15 November Rear Admiral King, Chief of the Bureau of Aero-
nautics, approved the recommendation for a design competition for
a carrier fighter. The contest pitted designs from Brewster de
Seversky and Grumman against each other. Grumman was to receive
Sill, 300 for their biplane, but it was scrapped after the company
saw it could not compete with Brewster's monoplane.
January 1936 saw the experimental scout-bomber (XSBF-1) ready
for the manufacturer's flight test. After passing these, it was
taken to Anacostia for naval testing. The XSliF-1 marked the first
time Grumman Aircraft was unable to gain a production order. It
lost in a competition with the Vindicator, a product of Chance
Vought of East Hartsford, Connecticut. Grumman" s bid was actually
lower than Chance Vought's, being priced at $1,473,722 while
Vought's contract read 51,346,308. 5 The Navy opted for the ex-
pensive contract for a variety of reasons. Vought had more experi-
ence building scouts and bombers than Grumman, which was viewed as
a supplier of fighters and utilities, giving Vought an upper hand.
This company was one of the Navy's prime aircraft suppliers so it
was obligated to keep them busy if it did not want the firm to
look elsewhere for business. The Navy liked to spread it's sales
around to keep a number of suppliers in business, and Grumman had
plenty of orders in 1935 to keep them busy. The Vought design may
have had better performance for which the Navy was willing to pay
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extra, although Grumman i t es believed their product at least equal-
led their competitions.
Photo 2.2 : The XSBF-1
Source: "A Decade of
Grumman Progress,"
Aero Diges t
, Jan. 1940
Photo 2.3 :
Source: Jane's All the „orld's Aircraft
,
193d, p. 270c.
Grumman's production forces were instrumental in placing new
aircraft with the naval air fleet and as yet every contract had
been completed in less than one year. Grumman delivered it's first
production JF-2 to the Mavy in April and by the end of Fiscal Year
1936 eleven were operated under naval control. Forty-nine F3F-ls
were placed in the Navy's control by 30 June, with the order of
fifty-four completed in August. The Navy used the fighters
aboard the carriers Hanger and Saratoga .
While the shop force labored on these airframes, the en-
gineers worked on a couple new designs in the corporation's two
areas of specialization, amphibians and fighters. The amphibian
was the G-21 Goose. It was the largest aircraft built by Grumman
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during the 1930s, and the company's first commercial product. :/,an-
a3e.1-.ent entered the commercial market now that the company had
capital to pay for it's design and indicators showed expansion in
the area. The G-21 was the corporation's first monoplane to fly,
using NACA's 23012 airfoil design. A pair of 400 h.p. Pratt S.
.vhitney Jasp Juniors were placed in nacelles leading into the high
wing. A top speed of 200 m.p.h. and a range of 300 miles was ex-
pected from the commercial amphibian. It was designed for eight
passengers plus the crew. The Goose was a flying-boat, since it's
floating capability came from it's own semi-monocoque hull and not
an attached float. The patented Grumman undercarriage retracted
from the hull, providing the Goose with it's amphibious capabili-
ty. Ralston Stalb, chief engineer for the G-21 project, had just
recently joined Grumman, but he was no stranger to the company's
management. He had been a chief engineer at Loening before it's
merger with Keystone, and therefore associated with Roy and his
cohorts. Stalb was a naval architect by training, i'nis influence
can be seen in the stout construction of the Goose, and it also
paralleled the corporation's philosophy on construction (See
Photos 2.4,2.5, £2.6 on following page). Roy likely had some input
as well, despite the fact that his presidential duties were keep-
ing him from spending much time as an engineer. His knowledge of
amphibians and desire to make the first commercial venture a
successful one would have overridden some of his unimportant
tasks, or allowing Jake to handle more of the administrative
dut ies
.
The decision to start the project came after a group of
wealthy New York businessmen led by William Lloyd-Smith having
been referred to Grumman by Grover Loening, discussed with the
Photo 2.4:
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The Grumman G-21 Commercial Amphibian (two 450 h.p. PratI & Whitney "Wasp-Junior" engines).
Source: Jane's All the world's Aircraft
, 1938, p. 271c.
Photo 2.5:
Center Section of the G-21's Wine
The Navy tntlutnC*- is ap-
parent in the husky center
ass* aasrasis*: fmMSaj!^fE!g^3sggj&
\gmf HWVtM BP.USMTT '
Source: "Grumman's An.phi bian
,
" Aviat ion
, vol. 36, no. 7 (July
1937)
, p. 37.
company's management the need for a quicker mode of transportation
to travel in the city so they could avoid the delays caused by the
congestion of New York traffic. Representatives of air commuters
rfere represented and each «re looking for new aircraft. The group
hoped Grumman could produce an airplane ideal for snort or long
business flights. For the first time Grutr..~an Aircraft had to pro-
vide all the funding for the development of an aircraft, but they
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vere almost assured of gain-
ing at least a few orders
from the groups of entre-
preneurs. '
Another engineering
team, under the guidance of
Bill Schwendler, worked on
the previously mentioned
biplane in competition with
designs from Brewster and
de Seversky. The project
was scrapped since the F3F
was already meeting the ex-
pected performance of the
new design and the engineers
realized that a biplane
f^ f. ? ^£argj2flThe heavy '..o^r frames andyj&'J&T^* ~ bottom furr..jn rigidity lor the \
fl?%yjCgSBSZ* qirder uiinocesaary. ft
Photo 2.o :
Source
:
"Grumman ' s Amphibian,"
Avia t ion
,
v. 3b, July 1937,
p. 37.
design could not operate with Brewster's monoplane (XF2A-1), Not
to be outdone, Grumman engineers also began working on a mono-
plane. This decision was important to Grumman staying on the lead-
ing fringe in naval aircraft development. Chief of Bureau of Aero-
nautics King approved Grumman's new monoplane design (XF4F-2) on
25 July. The XFiF-2 and XF2A-l's engineers both promised a top
speed of at least 300 m.p.h. for their respective designs.
Two more engineers were hired by Grumman at this time. Bob
Hall joined in a dual role, being a designer and a test pilot. He
had worked for Fairchild and Stinson, and was the designer of the
speedy but lethal handling Gee Bee racing plane. Hall, loving the
exhiliration of flight, test flew all the history-making aircraft
up to the jet age. " George Titterton also joined Grumman. He
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had worked for the Bureau of Aeronautics as a civilian engineer.
Titterton had been the Navy's representative at the manufacturing
flight of the XFF-1 years before. His understanding of the Navy's
bureaucracy would be another asset. These two further supplemented
the use of team design.
July 1936 contained another piece in Grumman' s naval fighter
development. On 25 July the Navy purchased the XF3F-2, a variant
in the F3F series. It was powered by a 1000 h.p. Wright Cyclone
rather than a Pratt & Whitney like the original version. The
Bureau of Aeronautics paid $26,300 for data, designs, and the mod-
ifications of the last production F3F-1 . It was not uncommon for
an experimental variant to be made from the last airframe of an
earl ier contract .
In the summer of 1935 the firm broice new ground with inter-
national orders. It's first export came from the Argentine Govern-
ment which ordered eight Ducks. The Company's other planes were on
the export market, but there was not an international demand for
carrier fighters. Only a few navies operated aircraft carriers,
and those that did produced their own naval aircraft. This situa-
tion continued until World .>ar 11; however an international deal
was made on one of it's fighters early in October 1936 between
Grumman and the Canadian Car S Foundry Company, Ltd. of Montreal.
These businesses announced that an agreement had been reached
giving the Canadian company the rights to build the FF-1 . The
Canadian Air Force planned to use it as an advanced trainer. Fif-
teen were built for this purpose, and they were named Goblin I.
One Canadian built FF-1 was delivered to Nicaragua, and another
showed up in Japan. Fifty more were delivered to Turkey, which
passed them to France where they were purchased by the Spanish
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Republican Air Force to take part in the Spanish Civil war which
began in 1936. Unfortunately I do not know whether they saw com-
bat, or how they faired if engaged in combat.
Grumman also worked on an aerobatic plane for Gulf Oil Com-
pany. Newcomer George Titterton headed the project. The plane had
been ordered after Al Williams, a former member of the Navy's rac-
ing team and currently stunt flyer and chairman of the aviation
department of Gulf Oil, flew the F3F-2 while looking for a re-
placement for his Curtiss F6C. Intrigued by the responsiveness of
the plane, he asked for a modified version to be called the Gulf-
hawk II. It was completed on 1 December 1936 and delivered to
Roosevelt Field, Long Island. The Culfhawk mated the fuselage of
the F3F with the wings of the F2F, and was powered by a luuO h.p.
Wright Cyclone. It was modified for enhancement of aerobatic capa-
bility by such methods as giving it a large tail, and by install-
ing oil and gas tanks which had several outlets plus extra pumps
which allowed it to fly inverted for one-half hour. It had a speed
of 290 m.p.h. at 12,000 feet and a 3,500 ft./min. climb rate. A
vivid color scheme was used to increase it's visibility. The air-
plane was coated in a glossy orange with blue trim with outward
radiating white stripes on the upper and lower wing surfaces. For
the next twelve years the Gulfhawk II thrilled air show audiences
in the United States and Europe. This use aided Grumman ' s public
image. In 1948 it became the property of the Smithsonian Institu-
tion and now hangs in the National Air & Space Museum."
After their recent agreement to build FF-ls, the Canadian Car
a Foundry sponsored a flight from New York to Montreal using the
tvvo-seat fighter. On 13 December Howard F. Klein took-off from
Roosevelt Field, Long Island, landing one hour and forty minutes
5fa
later at Montreal's St. Hubert Field. This was seventeen minutes
faster than Frank Hawk's 1931 record flight time between the two
cities. Two days later on his return flight Klein improved his own
time by ten minutes, thus on the two trips combined, he averaged
7 ?an airspeed of 220 m.p.h. '^ Such records also improved tne image
of the firm, bringing public recognition.
At the time this FF-1 was making a record, the FF-ls and
SF-ls were being withdrawn from the carrier fleet and being
assigned to the h'aval Reserve. This provides a perfect example of
the tremendous rate of performance growth and the short service
life of aircraft in the 1930s. These aircraft iiad only been in
service two or three years, yet they were already being downgraded
to the reserves. Aircraft were being produced that were 30 m.p.h.
faster, while others on the drawing boards were nearly 100 m.p.h.
quicker. Such fast improvement during the aeronautical revolution
caused the FF-1 and SF-1 to have had a design and experimental
phase that was nearly as long as it's front line service.
The XF3F-2 endured it's initial testing in January 1937, be-
ing sent on for naval testing. Variants of an already proven de-
sign did not have to go through the same testing procedure as new
models. This airplane endured three months of observation of the
mating of the 850 h.p. Wright Cyclone driving a Hamilton Standard
controllable-pitch propeller and the Grumman airframe. The Navy
was pleased with the results, ordering eighty-one of these naval
fighters on 23 March. It was the largest order for airplanes the
Navy had ever handed out at one time, the second time the company
received this distinction. The average price per plane was
316,536.73 The production F3F _ 2s could attain a raaximutn speed of
200 m.p.h., yet the landing speed still hovered around 66 m.p.h.
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The new F3Fs could reach an altitude of 32,000 feet, a record ser-
vice ceiling for pursuits. when cruising at 125 rn.p.h. the F3F-2
had a range of 975 miles. With only an ill increase over the ori-
ginal production version, yet a substantial rise in performance
over it's predecessor, the Navy got a good bargain. F3F-2s were
used aboard the Enterprise, which would be commissioned in 1938,
and in Marine squadrons. The entry of the new carriers and tne in-
crease in Marine Corps aviation were the stimulants causing the
large order. F3Fs served aboard the Fnterpri se until toay 1941, and
with the Marines until after the war broke out between the United
States and Japan.
Following the recpetion of the large contract, Grumman pre-
pared to occupy it's fourth home in it's eight year existence. The
decision to build a plant was made after finding out that the
Farmingdale complex presently being rented was to be sold to de
Seversky (later Republic). Construction of the new quarter million
dollar factory began the previous autumn on a one hundred and
twenty acre parcel of land located in Bethpage, Long Island. The
land was purchased at S300 per acre. Funding came from Grumman re-
serves and short-term loans. Under Clint Towl ' s supervision con-
struction progressed steadily. 3y the end of March 1936 the com-
pany began moving into the nearly completed structure, which had
twice the floor space of the previous site. By April the move
was corr.pl e t ed.
At the new plant the shop force got quickly to work on their
back-log of orders from the Navy. Despite the continual work on
airfran.es, it could not keep up with new orders. In May the Bureau
of Aeronautics ordered an additional fifteen Ducks for 5571,923,
which after the deduction of $114,385 for parts, the amphibians
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cost $30,000. " An additional fifteen amphibians were ordered in
August for the same price. c The reason for the increase in price
over Ducks sold in previous years was these were a new variant,
which had some design modifications.
The G-21 Goose neared the point when it would stop being a
financial drain when it made it's first flight on the last day of
May with Bud Gillies and Hob Hall at the controls. The flight test
progressed without a hitch, so ten ordered units were added to the
two already in the production process. On July 16 the first G-21
was delivered to Lloyd-Smith, who paid 360,000. Single orders for
the Goose continued to pour in during the rest of 1937, and
according to Aero Digest the owner's list of the G-21 became "a
veritable 'Blue Book' of important persons in America.'
America's richest were not the only elite to receive the amphibian
for in 1937 financier Ben Smith ordered a G-21 for his friend Lord
Beaverbrook, Great Britain's Minister of Aircraft Production. In
1940 Beaverbrook ordered another G-21. In the process Smith became
Grumman 's underwriter in the company's move to public stock.'"
The corporation began to feel the need for financial assis-
tance with the country's short lapse back into depression, the
need to relieve the shortage of capital caused by the recent ven-
ture into the commercial market, and the desire to expand to meet
the Navy's needs with the carriers .vasp and Hornet under construc-
tion to curb the growth of unfilled orders. It decided to go
public with it's stock. Ben Smith aided the company in register-
ing 140,000 shares of common stock with the Securities & Exchange
Commission, of which 95,000 were for public consumption, 5000 for
Grumman employees, and the final 40,000 reserved for exercise of
79warrants. J In October of the following year the business would
59
be listed on the New York Curb Exchange board. With the assistance
of the public, Grumman would continue to expand in the years prior
to America's involvement in world war II.
In 1937 Grumman attempted to improve it's relationship with
the Navy by hiring Oscar Olsen as a liason between the Navy De-
partment in Washington, D.C. and the corporation's headquarters in
!3ethpage. Since Grumman did not have an office in Washington D.C.
like many aeronautical manufacturers, Olsen flew there once a
week. Tuesday became "Grumman Day" at the Navy Department, with
Olsen meeting those with problems or questions concerning the cor-
poration's airframes. These affairs rfould be transmitted to Uetn-
page either immediately or in the following day, depending upon
the severity of the problem. The Company hoped to "earn the re-
spect and confidence of Navy people" by employing a liason. 60
On 2 September 1337 the XF4F-2 became airborne for the first
time under the guidance of bob Hall. Despite changing to a mono-
plane design after brewster completed it's airframe's blueprints,
Orumman's "wildcat" flew four months before Brewster's "Buffalo. "
The configuration of the XF4F-2 was different than the well-known
warbid that was produced later, it's outline favoring the bi-
planes. It had a three spar NACA airfoil located on the centerline
of the fuselage, where the biplanes had two spars; however these
wings, and the tail surfaces, had rounded tips like the biplanes.
The "razor back" aft of the cockpit curved down into the rear
fuselage rather than curving back up into the fin and rudder as it
would in later models. The horizontal tail plane fitted into tne
rear fuselage, but in later models it would be raised onto the fin
and rudder. A spinner was placed on the nose of the propeller (it
can barely be seen in Photo 2.7). The airframe was armed with four
DO
Photo 2.1 :
The XF4F-2
Source
:
Aviat ion
.
.50 calibre machine guns, two located in the nose and two in the
wing. The yoO h.p. single-state supercharged Pratt & Whitney
powered it to a speed of 290 m.p.h., which was less than promised
but slightly faster than Brewster's exper imental plane. The XF4F-2
had an increased rate of climb compared to the company's biplanes,
but it recorded a lower ceiling. After Brewster's monoplane flew
for the first time in January 1938, the struggle between the three
fighters from de Seversky, Brewster, and Grumman in a flight com-
petition officially began, the winner to receive a production con-
tract .
While the XF4F-2 competed with two rivals at the Navy's test-
ing grounds (See Part 2), Grumman workers continued to build and
design new airframes. One such plane was the Gulfhawk 111, the
second purchase by Al Williams of Gulf Oil Company. This special
two-seat biplane was completed and delivered on 6 May 1938.
Grumman Aircraft also Duilt one for it's own use, such as quick
flights to Washington, D.C. both of these planes would be taken
over by the Army Air Corps to be used as trainers after the war
came to America.
Grumman was indirectly influenced by Congress, which passed
the Naval Expansion Act of 193S on 17 May. It provided for an in-
crease in aircraft carrier tonnage to 175,000 tons, and to keep
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pace it authorized a 3000-plane navy. According to Secretary of
tne Navy Claude Swanson, "Demands of the fleet consistently re-
quire broader and more inclusive roles for aircraft in the tactic-
al organization. The importance of meeting these demands has re-
sulted in assigning greater precedence to aircraft deve lopment .
"
Aviation was paining status in the Navy.
In June Grumman received it's first production contract from
the United States Army. During fiscal year 1936 the Army Air Corps
obtained the XOA-9, a military version of the G-21 Goose. The Navy
also bought an experimental model, which was designated the
XJHF-1, during the same period. The naval version was purchased
for $74,000 just slightly higher than the commercial fee. td The
air corps granted the corporation a contract in June for twenty-
six amphibians and spare parts at a price of SI , 41 2
,
916. 6i Assum-
ing that 2U;s (5262,563) would be subtracted for spares, the Army's
0A-9s averaged $43,474, a reasonable price when compared to tne
566,000 of the commercial G-21. The low cost demonstrated the ad-
vantages of bulk purchases.
During the flight competition at Anacostia between the three
fighter prototypes, Grumman' s XF4F-3 encountered more than it's
share of problems. It first experienced engine trouble when a
crankshaft bearing burnt out. On another occasion the rear fuse-
lage caught fire. The worst came when a second engine failure
forced a crash landing. de Severksky's NF-1 also crashed during
the tests. Despite Grumman's prototype recording the highest
speed, Brewster's entry won by default owing to the trouble ex-
perienced by it's competitors. On 11 June 1936 the Navy purchased
fifty-four F2A-ls at an average price of 520,302 (a figure that
would prove to be to Grumman's advantage in the following year).^
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with Boeing's F4B-4 being retired from the fleet in 1938, Grumman
fighters constituted the only air superiority weapon on the
carriers and with the Marine Corps until the Buffalo began to
reach squadron service after the war began in 1939. Grumman Air-
craft had been the only manufacturer to receive orders for naval
fighters for approximately five years prior to Brewster's order,
quite a feat for such a young, small company.
In the first half of 1938 the engineering team had been work-
ing on a fighter design to be included in the Bureau of Aero-
nautic's competition to be held in June. This pursuit contest
initiated the Vought F4U Corsair, the reputable aircraft which
will be referred to later in the text. It also produced one of
Grumman's few failures, the XF5F-1 "Skyrocket." The blueprints of
the XF5F-1 showed a radically new outline, it being the first
twin-engine design for a carrier fighter. Another unique feature
was the fuselage which grew out of the main spar of the wing (See
ehoto 2.8). The tail unit sported twin fins and rudders mounted at
the edges of the horizontal stabilizers. Unlike the Grumman bi-
planes and the XF4F-2, the Skyrocket had square wings and control
surfaces. The large wingspan of forty-two feet was cut in half by
upward folding wings. On 30 June the Navy ordered the experimental
plane for a total of $248,000; with expenses broken down in the
following categories: ^
Design Data and Drawings 3 71,000
wind Tunnel Test ;..odel (full size) 5 10,000
Tests and Miscellaneous Data S 45,000
Airplane (2 engine) less engine and props S112.000
Final Corrected Information and Drawings j, 10 ,000
S24b' ,000
The Navy ordered two other aircraft from this design competition;
Photo 2.;
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The Grumman XF5F-1 Skyrocket
---Ha ~^i.
Source: Aviat ion
,
vol. 39, no. 11 (November 1940), p. 19.
the previously mentioned Vought XF4U-1 Corsair and the Bell XFL-1.
Lioth were conventional in outline, unlike the Skyrocket.
In the first six months of 193S a few orders for commercial
G-21 had been received. Since the corporation was quite busy and
did not have practical experience in marketing commercial air-
craft, this task was placed in the hands of Gillies Aviation Cor-
poration of Hicksville, New York; It was owned and operated by
Jack Gillies, brother of Grumman test pilot Bud Gillies. This com-
pany obtained eight orders for the $66,000 Goose. b7
In July the Navy took control of the XF3F-3
, which was the
last production F3F-2 transformed into an experimental plane. The
S 8conversion cost S12.750. Without putting the XF3F-3 through the
extensive testing procedure, since the airframe had already proved
itself and only minor modifications had been made to incorporate a
larger engine, the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered twenty-seven of
the single-seat biplane fighters at a unit price of 525 , 937
.
B ^
Compared to earlier F3Fs, this figure was quite high. Part of the
reason for the increase was the result of tne low number ordered,
but the previous month's loss to Brewster and the price charged
for the 3uffalo had a greater effect. The high price was un-
warranted, and the only real drastic deviation from the cost per
pound of Grumman aircraft (which will be shown later in the text).
The conservatism of the Navy shown through as it was willing to
purchase biplanes after it was conceded monoplanes were superior.
This type of thinking aided the 3ethpage manufacturer. The follow-
ing year these F3Fs went aboard the Yorktown
,
which had been
c omm issioned in 1937.
In September Grumman gained another contract from the United
States iJavy for it's utility series. Twenty J2F-3s were ordered,
still at a unit price of 530,100. Continued procurement of this
series showed the :Javy was pleased witn it's performance.
During the same period an export order for four G-21A
amphibians had been received from the Peruvian Air Force. These
planes were completed the following Spring. Lt. Commander ilumberto
Cal-Lino of Peru's Air Flotilla took control of the delivery to
his country in April 1939. The export contract totalled approxi-
mately 5200,000.
After the fifty-four Brewster Buffaloes were ordered in June
1938, Grumman went right to work to modify the XF4F-2. The result-
ing XF4F-3 brought about the well-known Grumman shape. (See Photo
2.10). To support the rising weight of the design, the wing area
was increased by a larger span and squared tips, thus giving the
airfoil a "plank-like" appearance. The fin and rudder was squared
as well. This squaring improved capability of mass production, the
Photo 2.9:
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Source: "Decade of Grumman Projrss," Aero Digest , vol. 36, no. 1,
p. 52.
first sign the company expected increased orders in the future.
The tail-plane was raised onto the rudder, the latter curving
gently down to join the fuselage spine. The Pratt & iVhitney Twin
wasp (XR-1S30-75) engine, with a two-stage, two-speed supercharg-
er, powered the airframe. It was expected to improve the wildcat's
performance at higher altitudes. The Navy ordered the XF4F-3 in
Photo 2.10:
An artist's rendi t ion
of the F4F-3, showing
the plank- like wing.
Also note the spinner
on the prop, which
was not part of the
production models.
Source: An Adver
tisement in Aero
Digest
,
vol
. 36
no . 1
, p. 51
"•-»-. MODEL F4F-3, the
"™B1 Grumman product.The performance of this
e
hghter is comparable to that
of any service type airplaneX ,n <he world. Conceded the
most potent weapon in the
U. S. Navys fighting squad-
rons, the F4F-3. like? allOrumman fighters, is intended
or operation from either
l:)nd or earner deck.
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October. It was not listed specifically in Aircraft Purchased by
the Havy Uept., FY 1939 , being one of the numerous orders record-
ed as "confidential."
Towards the end of 1938 the Bethpage plant sold two sets of a
dozen Ducks to the Argentine Navy and the United States Coast
Guard. J Considering the price paid for the J2Fs sold, each of
these contracts brought in approximately $434,300. In 193o the
corporation was branching out with exports to Peru and Argentina,
military sales to the Air Corps and the Coast Guard, and commer-
cial sales. Grumman became less dependent on the United States
Navy this year.
Although the corporation had not received any orders relating
to the rising world tensions over the possibility of war, the out-
look for military exports looked promising. This expectation, a-
long with the infusion of public capital, caused the company to
expand. It bought 100 acres of land adjacent to tneir current
headquarters at the end of 1938 for $28, 500. 92 This allowed space
for future plant addition which would soon be added.
Table 2.1 :
Y Billings Income % In-
E from
A Sales from
come
R US1-
1934 SI, 808, 400 SI, 368, 000 88%
1935 51,640,000 $1,114,000 87%
1936 SI, 915, 000 $1,719,000 84%
1937 $3,574,533*
1938 $4,904,941
Source: Threulsen, The Grumman Story
, p. 89.
*:.'.y own figure, which do not always correspond to Threulsen's.
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Table 2.2:
A
K
Exp,:ndi ture
1934 $12 ,273 ,000
1935. S20 ,691 ,000
1936 $26 ,561 ,000
1937 $20 ,963 ,000
1933 $27,,265,,000
U.S. Naval % Aircraft %
Aircraft Grumman Industry Grumman
Product ion
10. OS S 43,891,925 3. IS
4.7% 3 42,506,204 2.6%
5.4% $ 78.148.S93 2.2%
$115,076,950
7.4% $150,000,000 3.2%
Source: Freudenthal, The Aviation Business in the 1930s,"
The History of the American Aircraft Industry
, ( Ca.nbr idre
,
• ass: The mIT Press, 1968)
, p. 105.
"Naval Aircraft Expenditures 1920-1939," The Con-
gressional Record
, vol. 85, Part 2, 76th Con;-res s , 2cd
Session, pp. 727-28.
(the percentages are ay figures)
Table 2.3:
Y Units %
E Ordered from
A U.S.
K Navy
1932 30 1005
1933 34 100;.
1934 97 855!
1935 97 100*
1936 —
1937 124 905;
1938 112 665!
Uni t s
Del i ver ed to
USN
2 100%
29 100%
64 88%
72 90%
78 + 90%+
Source: "Industry & Finance," Aviat ion
,
(Oct. 1937), pp. 63-
64. Plus additional sources statin;; ^hen orders were com-
plete, etc. ( —means unknown).
Table 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 list Grumman ' s finances, orders, and
deliveries, and the company's progression compared to naval air-
craft expenditures and the industry's production. Grumman Air-
craft's income quadrupled from 1934 to 1935, as did it's orders
from 1933 to 1937. Despite these increases, the corporation
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initially declined in it's percentage of industrial production and
it's shares of share naval aircraft expenditures. The reason for
the fall in it's percentage of the aircraft industry's production
were the greater Air Corps expenditures and the improvement in tne
commercial market. between 1934 and 1938 the Army spent $129
million on aircraft compared to 373 million in naval spending. 33
Commercial production, though consistently below that for the
military services, was climbing during this period. It reached and
surpassed the levels attained before the Depression. The reasons
for this climb was the introduction of the modern airliners from
Boeing and Douglas. Grumman
' s sales were almost totally to the
Navy and Coast Guard from 1934 to 1936, thus explaining why tne
company's finances grew, yet reduced in comparison with the rest
of the industry. As the company entered other markets in 1937
through 1933 the firm's share of production began to increase,
management's decision to enter these markets proved to be bene-
ficial.
The expansion of carrier aviation was a big stimulus to
Grumman's growth. With the addition of three new carriers from
1934 to 1938, the need for carrier aircraft more than doubled.
Grumman Aircraft supplied nearly all the fighters for the fleet
during this period. This explains why the corporation's per-
centage of naval aircraft expenditures rose through most of the
period. The drop from 1934 to 1935 was the result of the doubling
of available funds, not a decrease in purchases from the manu-
facturer. Grumman had to compete for portions of the funding with
manufacturers building larger, more expensive aircraft. For ex-
ample, in 1937 the Bureau of Aeronautics announced the purchases
of nineteen amphibians, fifteen from Grumman and the remaining
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four to Sikorsky. Grumman's fifteen s ing 1 e-engi ned utilities to-
talled i;>54,300, while the four Sikorsky twin-engined amphibians
cost $327, c39. J It's growth in monetary income from the Navy
showed the company was supplying an increasing percentage of tne
number of Uavy aircraft.
The engineering success discussed in the text can be shown in
looking at the fleet service lives of the various fighters used a-
board the carriers during the 1930s. The average service life was
four years, yet Grumman' s three fighters averaged five years a-
board carriers. Only one of the fighters (the F2A) listed on Table
2
.
U saw combat in ,,orld '..ar 11 and none saw combat from a carrier.
To deduce the aircraft's combat ability, one can only compare per-
formance figures and service lives, and Grumman held high marks in
both categories.
Grumman's success in the mid-1950s was partly due to the low'
cost of it's airframes. It's fighters consistently stayed in the
55 range in cost per pound, with the lone exception (See Table
2.5). Other manufacturer's costs varied more. These airframes were
also just modified land planes, whereas Grumman aircraft were
built for the naval environment. The Long Island firm's other air-
craft sold to the military had lower costs (not including the air-
frames in the commercial market). The SF-1 and JF-1 were priced
at S5.15 and $3.64 per pound, respectively. Production efficiency
combined with the good designs and the growing need for carrier
fighters made Grumman successful in the mid 1930s.
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Fleet Service Li f e in the 1
:
330s
Years of
Plane Fleet
Service
Cur t i S3 F6C 3
Cur t i ss F8C 2
Cur t i s s BFC 6
Curt i ss BF2C 1/2
Boeing F3B
Boeing F4B
Grumman FF-1
Grumman F2F
Grumman F3F
Grumman F4F
Brewster F 2 A
Average
:
1/2
4 i/;
Table Carrier-Fighter Prices of the 1930s
Ai rplane Average price
per Airplane
limpty Weight
of Airplane
Price per
Pound
Boeing F4B-2 S 18,565
Boeing F4E-3 S 17,414
Boeing F4B-4 S 10,900
2,000 lbs. $ 9.28
2,301 lbs. 5 7.59
2,354 lbs. $ 4.65
Curtiss BFC-2 $ 14,731
Curtiss BF2C-1 S 15,613
3,037 lbs.
3,163 lbs.
$ 4.65
S 5.00
Grumman FF-1
Grumman F2F
Grumman F3F-1
Grumman F3F-2
Grumman F3F-3
Grumman F4F-3
5 19,000
S 14,515
b 16,525
5 16,536
S 25,037
S 26,472
3 ,221 lbs. S 5.90
2 ,625 lbs. 5 5.64
2 ,870 lbs. S 5.75
3,,250 lbs. $ 5.09
3.,250 lbs. S 7.70
5,,238 lbs. S 5.05
Brewster F2A-1 S 25,302 4,420 lbs. $ 6.40
'art HI
The Impact of the iiuropean ,,ar and Tensions
in tne Pacific on Grumman Aircraft, 1939-1941
The period from January 1939 to December 1941 was a critical
period for Grumman Aircraft in many ways. Grumman had established
itself as an eminent naval biplane fighter manufacturer, but the
ago of the biplane was over. Brewster had the jump in monoplane
fighters after the Buffalo beat the wildcat, so the Bethpage man-
ufacturer would have to make up some .qround to re-establish it's
previous position. The three year period was also important for
the planes to see combat in world war II were beinj designed and
tested. The engineering corps played a crucial role at this time,
for the success of the firm's airframes depended upon their
ability. Grumman's finances or orders were not affected by the
tensions in Europe until after the war began. ...ost of the European
countries expected to build all of their aircraft in their own
factories. With the outbreak of war, the belligerents turned to
the United States for assistance in this area. Their need was re-
sponsible for a suroe in orders and income at Grumman, as well as
the entire industry. Tensions increased in the Pacific as well as
Japan became more aggressive. The naval limitation treaties had
not been in effect since 1936, yet no Significant naval expansion
had yet been undertaken. It was not until approximately one and a
half years prior to Pearl Harbor that Grumman felt the first in-
dications that the .\avy was expanding, and most of the rise in
orders came in the final twelve months before the surprise attack.
These three years allowed Grumman to expand it's facilities and
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design the warbids, thus placing it in a position to be counted
on to supply so many aircraft during the Second ,.orld ,Var.
The year 1939 began with Julie Ho 1 pi t and his experimental
crew working on the XF4F-3, showing their metal by completing it
in four months. After a successful first flight on 12 February, it
was turned over to the Navy for evaluation. In the six months
spent at Anacostia, the .Vildcat attained a maximum speed of
334 ra.p.h., an initial rate of climb of 2,800 feet per minute, and
a service ceiling of 3,500 feet. Grumman and Navy officials de-
cided to reposition all four guns in the wing, rather than placing
two in the nose and two in the wing. The monoplane had ample room
in the airfoil for the guns, and this placement did not require
synchronized gear to shoot through the propeller. The loss to
Brewster proved to be advantageous, for the new design was far
superior to the XF4F-2.
Grumman's commercial Goose was proving to be a fine military
vehicle, gaining two contracts in the Spring of 1939. The Navy
wanted twenty JKFs, and the Coast Guard asked for ten. The average
price per plane was $41,675 on these contracts, considerably less
than the commercial price and two thousand less than the Air
Corps' order despite the lower number contracted. The Bethpage
corporation treated it's best customer well.
During the first four months of 1939 aircraft deliveries
brought in 31,755,474 in income, 24% more than the same period in
1938. - Part of these deliveries were the final F3F-3s, for the
contract was completed in .\.ay
. These aircraft filled the fighter
squadron aboard the York town
, which had been commissioned in 1937.
Grunraan fighters now composed all the carrier fighter squadrons of
the United States Navy, showing the dominance it had in rrainino
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orders for naval pursuits in the rald-1930s.
Management's decision to obtain financial assistance by going
public' with it's stock in 1937-38 was beginning to be noticable
when the company occupied the new addition to it's plant. Con-
struction began at the start of 1939, and added tnree thousand
square feet of floor space. This did not include the new paint
spraying room that was completed within a few weeks. The Bethpage
factory now contained 48,000 square feet of work space for it's
700 workers, roughly equal to the area taken up by forty-eight
l-'3ir s placed wing tip to wing tip. Jb The financial assistance also
allowed the firm to buy the machine tools to be used in the new
work area.
Phot o 3.1: Grumman 's Plant Mo. 1
1939. our present modern plant
at Bethpage. Long Island, N. Y
Source: Advertisement in
Aero Digest
,
vol. 36, no. 1, p. 51,
The engineering improvement of the Wildcat paid dividends in
August 1939. Brewster's Buffalo entered squadron service in June
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with a top speed of 323 m.p.h., a 2,500 feet per minute initial
climb rate, and a 34,000 foot celling, all of which were below or
roughly equal to the XF4F-3 then testing at Anacostia. y ' The ,'Javy
did not hesitate very Ions, before granting a contract on S August
for fifty-four Wildcats. These fighters averaged $426,472 per
plane, nearly 32,000 less than a single buffalo.'' The Navy paid
51.35 less per pound for the wildcat, yet it was receiving a
better airplane. Grumman was again competing with lirevster to see
which company would emerge as the main supplier of naval fighters.
With Hitler's attack on i'oland on 1 September 193S, britain
and France declared war on Germany. The navies of both countries
needed aircraft and looked to the United States to augment their
own industrial output. Among the needs of France was a carrier-
based fighter to be used on the Dearn and two |of f re class carri-
ers which had just been laid down. After war broke out, French
policy was to concentrate aircraft purchases in the United States,
and Grumman Aircraft was included in it's orders. Colonel
(Jacques) Jacquin, chairman of the French Purchasing Commission
ordered 100 G-36AS (wildcats) from Bethpage. These fighters were
to be powered by the Wright Cyclone since the French were already
experiencing delays in the delivery of the Pratt & Whitney with
the two-stage, two-speed supercharger. The Twin Wasps were in
short supply because of the numerous orders, and the time con-
suming mechanical setbacks it's supercharger encountered. Grumman
had to modify the nose of the G-36 for the .'.right Cyclone, but
within a week one took to the air with the new engine.
France and britain, realizing they would need the assistance
of the American aircraft industry, paid inflated prices for the
aircraft provided by United States factories. The reasons for the
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exxagerated payment were twofold. It was to insure production of
these airframes was completed posthaste. It was also to give these
manufacturers capital to expand. With the fall of France the
following June, this order (which has been reduced to 51) was
transferred to Britain.
while Hitler and Stalin conquered Poland and enjoyed their
spoils, the engineering staff at the Bethpage plant worked on
several new designs. The Bureau of Aeronautics announced in 1939
a design competition for a torpedo-bomber for the carrier fleet.
The Navy wanted a 300 m.p.h. airplane with a scouting, range
(without ordinance) of 3000 miles, an internal weapons bay, self-
sealing fuel tanks, and plate armour. bob rial 1 was placed in
charge of Grumman' s project, which became the TBF Avenger.
The engineers also worked on a second plane to be placed on
the commercial market. It was a smaller version of the G-21,
taking the name G-ii Widgeon. The G-44's plans snowed accomoda-
tions for four to five passengers, giving businessmen a smaller
and cheaper transport.
Draftsmen labored to modify the XF5F for the United States
Army Air Corps, which designated it the XP-50. Unlike in the XF5F,
the blueprints showed a fuselage stretched forward ahead of the
wing and a hydraul ical ly operated tricycle landing gear extending
from the tip of it's nose. The two supercharged ..right Cyclones
rotated in the opposite direction to avoid the problems of torque.
The Air Corps was interested enough to order a prototype on 25
November, despite a high investment.
In the latter part of 1939 the Bureau of Aeronautics asked
for a Wildcat with folding wings. The Royal Navy stored all it's
carrier planes in the hangar decks, so every square foot saved was
7o
important; thus it was also deeply interested. Grumman wished to
avoid folding the wings straight up since this weakened the wing
structure. Designers also had to contend with the various hangar
deck heights in aircraft carriers. with paper clips and drafting
erasers, Roy Grumman developed the idea behind his patented "sto-
wing." r..echancial ly
, "the mainplane pivoted about the mainspar as
they folded back to lie against the fuselage sides."-'" This system
was similar to a bird tucking it's wings back along it's body. The
sto-wing reduced the wingspan of a Wildcat from 3o feet to \L feet
four inches, a 62% reduction. One aviation historian called the
inclined single-hinge system a "brilliant and simple idea, tvpical
of the company's approach to design." 100 After designing the sto-
wing and discussing the system with the Navy, it was ordered on a
Wildcat, which was designated XF4F-4, in March 1940. Grumaian' s in-
genuity again brought results that would eventually reap rewards.
The war in Europe caused a short change in the main bene-
factors of Grumman's production. The first production model of the
F4F-3 made it's first flight in February 1940. The Dethpage manu-
facturer had planned to provide the U. S. Navy with as many of the
F4Fs as possible when it received the initial Wildcat contract,
showing it had the best carrier fighter available. But with the
war in Europe, France's 1939 G-36 production order took prece-
dence, wildcats which soon began rolling off the production line
were sent to the Europeans. In 1940, Great Britain received the
majority of planes coming from Grumman's assembly line. The XF5F-1
twin-engined fighter was completed in March, making it's first
flight on 1 April with Bud Gillies controlling, the joystick. The
experimental plane was then handed over to the Navy for more test-
ing. Several delays were experienced at Anacostia, for the radical
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design and it's engines experienced numerous "teething" problems.
..hen functional, it recorded a speed of 358 m.p.h. at sea level,
and 380 rn.p.h. at 16,500 feet. It had an initial rate of climb of
4000 feet per minute, thus gaining the name "Skyrocket." While
under the Navy's control the XF5F-1 «s reported to outfly any-
thing it met in tne air due to it's speed and climb. Despite it's
performance, the Skyrocket had some flaws in it's design. For one,
the pilot had an obstructed landing view, a fatal vice for any
carrier aircraft, with the placement of the cockpit at the train-
ing edge of the wing. The size of the plane and it's radical out-
line were also considered detriments. The problems encountered
during testing brought in more negative views. The anticipated
high price was yet another factor keeping the Skyrocket from
making progress, but Grumman had other projects to take it's
place .
The XTBF-1 moved forward on S April when the corporation got
the go ahead to build two experimental three-seat torpedo-bombers.
The blueprints held all the Navy's desired characteristics of
speed, range, and an internal weapons bay. The Avenger was the
first plane used by the Navy to hold it's torpedo inside a bomb
bay. The drafts also included the sto-wing, reducing it's 54' 2"
span to IS' 4" (a 66% decrease). An electrically-driven dorsal
turret was to be used, another first for an American single-engine
bomber. An outward-retracting undercarriage was utilized, making
the Avenger the first Grumman production model not to use Roy's
patented landing gear. The outline of the XTBF-1 resembled an en-
larged Wildcat, with it's barrel fuselage and square wings and
tail.
The first export G-36A lifted off at Bethpage on 11 r„ay, just
7b'
I'hoto 3.2:
Two views of the Grumman
Avenger, which served in
The U.S. Navy and the
Royal Navy during World
..ar II.
Source: Eric brown, iv ingj
of the Navy
, p. 125.
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after Germany's invasion of the west. A few reached France, but
the order was transferred to Great Britain after the fall of
France on 22 June. Britain received it's first G-35A on 27 June.
The Admiralty renamed the fighter the :..artlet :,.kl. Upon reaching
the Royal Navy, the Martlet «as it's fastest airplane. Captain
Eric brown of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm, who set a record for
the number of deck landings while flying various aircraft, stated;
"1 will always maintain the Martlet had the best landing char-
acteristics of any naval aircraft that 1 flew... It offered good
forward vision, excellent slow flying characteristics, a robust
undercarriage fully capable of absorbing the most punishing verti-
cal velocities and an intelligently positioned arrestor hook that
could convert a shaky approach into a safe arrival." The Martlet
was "designed specifically for the naval evironment, to such a de-
gree tnat it was easier to takeoff and land on an aircraft carrier
than on a runway..." brown was also impressed with other aspects
that aided the pilot in air combat, such as the all around view
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(with even two windows on the floor of the cockpit for limited
downward visibility). Seeing the other guy first has always been a
vital need for air combatants. The (tartlet also had a "good rate
of roll" in maneuvering, and provided a stable platform for gun-
nery. Brown believed the initial rate of climb, which he stated as
3300 feet per minute, "was one of the most sensational aspects of
the performance of this little f ight er . . . (j J here was nothing a-
round to touch it." Brown concluded the Martlet was "one of the
finest shipboard aeroplanes ever created." Brown's assessment
of the Martlet was the summation of two factors. First, he saw the
results of the engineers' design for naval envi ronmen t . He also
was affected by the poor performance of British naval aircraft,
thus making the Martlet seem even better than it was.
By October 1940 the eighty-one Martlets were completed and
delivered to Britain. They entered squadron service the same
month, replacing the Sea Gladiators of &04 Squadron. 102 Gru.i.man
provided the :<oyal Navy with a fine aircraft when Britain was
hardpressed for fighters to defend their homeland. The heightn of
the Battle of Britain had just passed, and planes and pilots were
in short supply. The first batch of .Martlets would operate from
the shore, but later deliveries would be utilized aboard the
British carriers.
The United States Navy gained legislation in June 1940 which
was important to the surge of naval aircraft orders which took
place during the last year before America's involvement in the
war
- The 11% Expansion Act of U June increased aircraft carrier
tonnage to 79,500 tons and authorized an increment In naval air-
craft from 3,000 to 4,500. The following day the Aviation Ex-
pansion Act enlarged the number to 10,000. Yet another bill,
oO
the 70% Expans ion Act
,
was passed on 19 July, increasing the
number of planes authorized to 15,00u. Congress also appropriated
two billion dollars for aviation purposes for fiscal year 1941 (JO
June 1940 through 30 June 1941), which was nearly half of the
total defense bill. Of the 19,000 planes to be built, 4,000 were
to be for the Navy. The Bureau of Aeronautics received $125
million in cash and 3375 million in contract authority to purchase
the aeronautical equipment for the Navy. The appropriation bill
also provided the funds for twenty Essex class carriers. The
effects of this legislation would soon be felt by Grumman. 1(Jj
While Grumman's military market looked promising, it also
took a step forward in the commercial market with the first flight
of the C-44 widgeon on 2b June. But Gillies ana Roy Grumman pilot-
ed the successful flight of the amphibian (showing iioy's involve-
ment in all aspects of manufacturing, and his desire to shuck his
administrative duties at times). Construction of production models
for single buyers began right away. Discussions would soon begin
between the Navy and Grumman over the former's use of the G-44.
August 1940 was a big month for the growth of Grumman's
business and an indication the U.S. Navy was preparing for war.
On 3 August the United States Navy placed an order for ten utility
Ducks. Two days later the Navy awarded the "Iron Works" it's big-
gest contract to date. Two hundred forty-three F4F-3 wildcats jere
purchased for $7,260,280, dropping it's average price to
$23,361. This looks to be the point at which the Navy made the
decision to replace the Buffalo with Wildcats. Only eleven of the
initial order for fifty-four Buffaloes had been given to the Navy,
the remaining had been sent to Finland. An improved version of the
F2A had been ordered but only one hundred and eight were produced.
£1
GrumjT.an was ajain on top of the United States Navy's fighter list.
In six months Gruir.man
'
s backlog grew to 58", while Brewster's
showed little significant increase. -'
In the three months of July, August, and September the com-
pany shipped $3,779,619 worth of airframes, including sixty-four
F4Fs (Martlets). It had not been many years when this would have
been a year's production. New sales made in the same period
totalled $14,c07,000. This figure came from the U.S. Navy pur-
chases and a British order for 100 Martlet &ik lis with a standard
Pratt £ Whitney engine. These contracts pushed Grumman's backlog
to 320 million. 106
The great volume of orders in 1940 made plant expansion man-
datory. In September 1940 the company purchased a fifty-three acre
farm adjacent to it's factory. The new acreage was to be the lo-
cation for a new "blackout" factory designed and constructed dv
the Austin Company. The nearly 500,000 square feet structure held
a 140 foot center aisle for final assmebly with iiOU foot alleys on
both sides to build smaller units such as the wing and tail,
rlourescent tubes and v.azda high-intensity lamps lighted the work-
shops. A network of overhead conveyor belts was utilized to keep
the workers supplied with materials. A twelve hundred seat cafe-
teria, a locker room, a communication system, air-conditioning,
and two thousand space parking lot were also part of the project.
The 52,100,000 factory was to be completed in 120 working days.
Funding for the plant came from several sources. Grumman was aided
by the inflated prices it charged the Allies at war with Germany
and Italy. The United States Government's new corporation income
tax code, which allowed aircraft manufacturers to depreciate new
construction in five years, helped lower the overall cost. The
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company ,-nainly made use of the Emergency Plain Facilities program,
where the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (KFC) loaned the
manufacturer it's building costs in a five year plan. After the
five year period, the KFC either took ownership of the plant's
title or it sola the factory to the firm. Plant Mo. 2 was soon
completed, and it played a key role in the output of Grumman air-
craft throughout the upcoming war. 107
On Christmas Day 1940, Grumman Aircraft received a "present"
in the feat by two of it's airplanes which brought the company
some publicity and proved it's product could perform the task it
was designed for. On that day two Grumman-made Martlets of
Britain's 304 Squadron, piloted by Lt. L.V. Carver and SubLt. A.
Parke destroyed a German Junker (Ju 6b) twin-engine bomber as it
attempted to attack the British Flet at Scapa Flow. The Ju 66 was
one of the better performing medium bombers of the Luftwaffe,
which made the accomplishments even more spectacular. The dis-
tinction of the victory was that it was the first air-to-air
"kill" by an American-made airplane during ..orld War 11. Grumman
workers proudly boast of their plane's tour de force. 100
December 1940 was another distinctive month for the contracts
awarded the Bethpage Corporation. Eight months before the XTBF-1
made it's first flight, the Avenger edged out Vought's design in
gaining a production order. The United States Navy procured 28b
torpedo bombers for S30 million, by far the largest order ever re-
ceived by Grumman up to that time. The unit price of the TBFs was
$84,688. The largest order was followed by a S6 million purchase
of 144 J2F-5 Ducks. The big orders for torpedo bombers and utili-
ties, coupled with the large order for fighters four months earli-
er showed the Mavy was finally anticipating the likelihood of war,
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and were preparing for it. With these orders, Grum.T.an's backlog
rocketed to $60 million at the beginning of 1941. To combat this
rise the corporation began to use the two ten-hour shifts to get
production moving at a swifter pace. 10 -*
Early in 1941 the United States Navy asked for ninety-five
F4F-3As (wildcats using the Wright Cyclone with a single-stage
supercharger) as an insurance measure in case the newer Pratt £
Whitney failed. The latter was experiencing difficulties with it's
t»/o-stage blower. By the end of the year sixty-five F4F-3AS *ere
in operation with the Navy and Marine Corps.
In 1941, Greece was anxiously trying to obtain modern fighter
planes. It had been attempting to purchase these aircraft from the
United States since the fall of France in June 1940. The Royal
liellenic Air Force was totally dependent on foreign manufacturers.
Greece tried to go through proper and improper channels to buy
Curtiss P-40s, but numerous obstacles were met. For one, U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was initially unwilling to hear
the request. Secondly, Britain continually remained opposed, be-
lieving it's imports from the U.S. would be impaired by a Greek
purchase. Another obstacle was President Roosevelt's unwillingness
to consent to aid while campaigning for his third term. On 28
October Italy declared war on Greece, creating a greater demand
for the fighters, but the release of planes still met snags. Henry
Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of Treasury for the United States, sug-
gested Britain receive the P-iOs, and in return send another
fighter to the Hellenic peninsula. The British agreed to send the
Boultan-Paul Defiant, but Greece was not willing to accept the
Defiant in lieu of the Curtiss t.arhawk/Tomahwak
. The United States
had promised to supply the aircraft, so the government continued
Si
pressing for a visible solution. In January 1941 Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy, recommended that Greece purchase thirty of
the F3Fs currently being replaced by more modern fighters aboard
the i<asp
,
but the Hellenic government was unwilling to accept ob-
solete Grumman biplanes. On 11 February Morgenthau informed Knox
that thirty Grumman Wtlcats were to be sold instead. Knox was i-
rate, and only a presidential order forced him to rele.iate the
planes intended for the Navy to go to Greece. The Navy was still
able to stop the shipment, for the Neturality Acts required Admir-
al Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to approve the
items as non-essential to national security. The Navy stated the
sale would interfere with the passage of Lend-Lease, so the order
was halted. The passage of the latter on 11 ..larch made the de-
livery of planes possible; however for a short time President
iioosevelt hampered the sale by planning to send the planes to
Britain since it was now aiding Greece. lie felt British pilots
would be better prepared to use the modern fighters. Roosevelt re-
versed his decision just prior to the German invasion on 6 April
1541. The shipment of F4Fs was on it's way the following week, but
was held up at Gibraltar as Hitler's two-prong attack rolled down
the Hellenic peninsula. Britain took control of the thirty F4Fs,
and ordered ten more like them, all of which were designated Mart-
let Ills. 110
At the time the Navy was concerned about the loss of it's
Wildcats, it also anxiously waited for the development of the sto-
wing so it could be utilized on carrier aircraft. Grumman, making
sure the folding wing would stand up to the stress of flight and
landings, took it's time. On 14 April the XF4F-4 left the ground
for the first time. The prototype had a hydraulic wing folding
mechanism, but in production models it was folded manually— a task
for the carrier deck crew. The sto-wing and other modifications
soon incorporated into the Wildcat, such as the inclusion of self-
sealing fuel tanks; plate armour and bullet-proof glass for pilot
protection; and the increase to six .50 calibre machine guns (add-
ed after the British recommendation), and the weight of the F4F
increased to nearly 8000 lbs. Thus a slightly slower and more
sluggish Wildcat was created, but also one less destructable and
one taking up less carrier deck or hangar space.
The first operational use of the wildcat with the Pacific
Fleet came in *iay 1941. Lt. Commander Clarence .vade McClusky's
Fighting Six (VF-6) aboard the U S . S Enterprise was the first
squadron to obtain the Wildcat. The air unit exchanged it's F3F-2s
A Group of FiF-i wildcats:
tit
': j
Photo 3.4 :
Source: O'Leary, United States Nava l Fighters of World War II
p. 38 (USN). 5
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for eighteen F4F-3As. Other carrier fighter squadrons would con-
vert to the wildcat throughout the year.
Although the twin-engined Skyrocket was discarded by the Mavy
after 211 test flights, it's sister, the XP-50, was still of in-
terest to the Air Corps. But this changed after it's supercharger
blew up and caught fire on it's maiden voyage on 14 May. Bob Hall
brought it down to land, but the hydraulic lines had been severed
and the back-up system failed to lower the nose gear. Hall bailed
out, letting the XP-50 crash in the depths of Long Island Sound.
Becuase of this failure, along with the Air Corps' interest in
Lockheed's P-3S Lightning and a new twin-engine project by
Grumman, the XP-50 was cancelled.
Although it's first twin-engined fighter had been terminated
by both services, Grumman had another to take it's place. The C-51
design used a tricycle undercarriage for improved taxiing; a cock-
pit placed well ahead of the wing for excellent visibility for-
ward; a 5 1/2 foot, square-tipped wing utillizing an upward fold-
ing mechanism; and a long slender fuselage with a sharp-edged
spine flowing into the tail giving the "Tigercat" it's "sleek"
looks. With two 1,800 h.p. Wright engines, Grumman anticipated a
maximum speed of 430 m.p.h. On 19 May 1941, just days after the
XP-50 crashed, the Air Corps ordered two prototypes which were
called XP-65. The Navy also showed interest, ordering two on 30
June, which were designated XF7F-1 . While moving through the ex-
perimental stage with this design, Grumman came to the conclusion
that the requirements desired by the two services were unique e-
nough that both could not be filled. This attitude likely came
from pressures by the services to deal exclusively with them.
There was at this time an unwritten guideline forming in the air-
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craft industry to deal primarily with a single service. Grum.-r.an
stuck to naval aircraft construction.
Photo 3.5: The F7F Tigercat
Source: O'Leary, p. 140. This is a -3N version housing radar in
it's nose. It was used as a night-fighter.
Another important fighter design was on the drawing boards in
the first half of 1941. This pursuit had a background of designs
dating back to 193b when the company studied the idea of using a
larger engine in the wildcat. The outline had been formed in
January and was given it's "final definition" in Specification SD-
236 and Report No. 2421 on 24 February 1941. The F5F Hellcat was
1 1 o
officially started.
In June the Navy asked Grumman for an improved wildcat in
case of delays in the Vought F4U Corsair, which came out of the
previously mentioned 1933 design competition. Grumman instead
showed them the blueprints for the new design, and the Navy order-
ed two on the last day of the month. The Hellcat first used the
Wright Cyclone, but with the delays encountered by tne Corsair and
Republic's P-47 Thunderbolt, it switched to the Pratt & Whitney
Double Wasp engine with it's two-stage, two-speed supercharger,
often considered the best radial piston engine ever used. It gave
the first production Hellcats a speed of 375 m.p.h. These FSFs
were flying a year and a half after the experimental order. Only
i*orth American's P—51 Mustang could claim a faster development,
and this was only by one month. Because of the rising weights be-
ing encountered in combat aircraft, Grumman designers put an
... *v-,"x
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immense wing on the liellcat. It was the largest airfoil to be used
on a single-engined fighter during the war with a span of nearly
forty-three feet and a wing area of 334 square feet. Two-thirds of
the wingspan was eliminated during storage with the installation
of the sto-wing. The big powerplant and the large wing gave the
XF6F an initial climb rate of nearly 3,000 feet per minute and
production versions 3,650 feet per minute. Speed and climb had
been seen as being extremely important in combat in Europe before
America's involvement. General Manager Swirbul visited England
during the Battle of Britain and became informed of what was need-
ed. He later went to the Pacific after Japan at tacked ' the United
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States, and naval pilots' supported the earlier information. The
knowledge gained in these trips was incorporated into the Hell-
cat's structure .
In June workers continued to build wildcats and Martlets as
orders came in for more to be made. There were still ninety Mart-
let lis to be contructed, all of which would use the sto-win"
(the first ten on the contract did not have the folding wing). An
additional 150 Martlet Mk IVs (equivalent to F4F-4 except for the
use of a Wright eigine) were placed on order by the British. The
United States Navy followed «f i t h another 436 F4F-4s during the
summer. Five of the latter were delivered by the end of the year.
The war in Europe was having an effect on Grumman ' s new sales, but
the Davy's preparation for a struggle at sea had a much greater
impact in this area.
In the first six months of 1941, Grumman ' s unfilled orders
had risen to $70 million despite working two shifts. Income during
this period equalled over 39 million, a 287% increase over the
amount earned by 30 June the previous year. Net profit in this
period was $747,218. Every business category was skyrocketing, as
was the entire industry's production and financial statistics.
Grumman's share of the orders placed in the aircraft industry
still hovered around 1.0%. *
The next five months were a busy period for Grumman. In 1941
sixty-nine Widgeons were sold, thirty-three to individuals. The
Coast Guard obtained twenty-five. The remaining eleven G-44s were
originally ordered by the government of Portugal, but were com-
mandeered by the United States Army after the Japanese surprise
attack. more were sold to the Navy, and also to the British
(called Goslings), during the war. 11 -'
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On 1 August 1941 the Avenger made it's first flight. Although
the XTBF-1 nearly ,net the requirements promised, the Avengers pro-
duced in quantity did not have the speed or ceiling originally
specified. The rising weights of pilot protection, fuel tanKs, and
more caused the reduction in performance. It was nicknamed "Tur-
key" by naval pilots who viewed it's ability to fly when it's
"wings were clipped," for without power the TBF lost altitude
fast. Despite the shortcomings the Avenger performed their tasks
admirably, especially when escorted by Grumman or Vought fighters.
With the initial flight and the previous production order for
TBFs, two of the three major warbirds built by the corporation had
flown and were in mass production by the time the United States
entered the Second World har. The third had received an experi-
mental order. Thus Grumman, like the industry as a whole, fought
the war with pre-war designs.
Table 3.1 shows the financial development of Grumman during
the four years prior to the United States entry into '..orlc ,iar II.
The company was growing at a rate similar to the mid- t hi r t ies
until the war broke out in Europe. This event caused the corpora-
tion's financial statistics to skyrocket. In 1940 it's total in-
come doubled over the previous year's total. By the end of the
first half of 1941, gross income already exceeded the 1940 total,
assuring a second consecutive doubling of annual gross profits.
Net profits grew, too, but not at such a high rate. Unfilled or-
ders made the greatest leap, growing from three and a half million
dollars at the end of 1933 to seventy million dollars by 30 June
1941. Compared to the aircraft industry, Grumman ' s backlog advanc-
ed at a similar rate. The affect the war had on the company was
analogous to the results of all the manufacturers, i.e., it was
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obtaining the same amount of orders as the rest of the industry.
The war in Europe had a major impact on the amount of exports
contracts the company received. Table 3.2 shows that these rose
from 4% of the planes procured in 1938 to 41% in the year the war
began. In the second half of 1940, the United States Navy began to
prepare itself for war after Japan took advantage of France's
Table 3.1 : Grumman' s Finance's 1938-40
Y Grumman 's Grumman Grumman 's Grumman'
s
E Backlog Backlog Gross Net
A (end of) vs. Income Profits
R Industry
1938 S 3,500,000 34,904,946 S 617,074
1939 5 6,000,000 1.0% 54,482,350 $ 892,063
1940 $63,500,000 1.6% $8,811,294 $1,415,916
1941
1st 6
months $70,000,000 1.0% $9,001,013 $747,218
Sources : "Aviation Finance: Current Earnings Report," Aviation,
vol. 39 (May 1940), p. 84.
( 1 vol> 4 ( iiay 1941), p . in.
,
1 vol . 4 (Cct. 1941), p. 131.
Table 3.2 :
y ft % % %
E planes USN Military US Army
A ordered Export Air
R Corps
1S3S 112 66% 4% 23%
1939 194, 38% 41% 1%
1940 651 1 S5% 15%
1941* 790 86% 5% 0.2%
t number may be too low, for Threulsen stated 759 wildcats (p. 122)
ordered in 1940. Even by adding the 95 F4F-3As which Swanborough
and Bowers state as ordered in 1941 (p. 206)—which makes our
1941 Wildcat orders roughly the same— the most I get is 592.
*Does not include orders after 12/7/41.
(The graph may exclude some comn.erc i a 1 sales the author is
unaware o f
)
~~
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helplessness after German conquest by invading and occupying
French Indochina. The United States demanded, through the oracle
splendor of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in July 19A1 that
Japan relinquish it's "protectorship", imposing embargoes on such
materials as iron and oil until it did so. It's refusal made war
inevitable. Under this backdrop of events, the Navy geared for
war. In the last sixteen months before the war began, it awarded
Grumman four very large contracts for F4Fs (2 orders), TBFs and
J2F-5s. The Navy's preparation for war caused it's return as
Grumman Aircraft's main market.
The successf ulness of the company during the last three
years before Pearl Harbor can be illustrated by the achievement of
planes designed and produced during this period. Each of the cor-
poration's planes, except the J2F series, was designed, tested, or
in the early stage of production between 1939 and 1941. These
planes showed their "metal" in the war.
The amphibians or the J2F series, and the naval versions of
the Goose and rtidgeon, performed many unglorious tasks during the
interwar period. Aviators learned the procedures to aerial search
and rescue, air patrol, and personnel and supply transport. The
J2F also aided many to learn the art of aerial gunnery by pulling
the target sleeve. After the war began these airplanes continued
to fulfill the jobs that do not get the notoriety they deserve.
Though these roles were often monotonous and certainly unglamor-
ous, they were still important to the total war effort.
Of Grumman's combat aircraft of '.vorld War II, only the wild-
cat had been produced in quantity by the time Japan attacked the
United States. .Vhen the war began the F4F was entrenched as the
number one fighter for the Navy. Although Harvard's Graduate
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School of business showed that 471 F2A Buffaloes had been accept-
ed to only 430 Grumman wildcats, Richard Threulsen save a more
realistic portrayal of U. S. Navy fighter strength, listing 250
wildcats to 90 Buffaloes. b In terms of front-line carrier ser-
vice the F4F was certainly top dog. Of the 162 fighters aboard the
seven fleet carriers available in December 1941, all but 18 were
wildcats. 117
The F4F could not equal it's prime adversary, the Japanese
Zero (Zeke), in a dogfighting dual; however it could more than
hold it's own against an equal or superior number of enemy fight-
ers when operating as a group and utilizing tactics founded upon
it's ruggedness and firepower. As one marine pilot involved in the
highly contested airspace over Gaudacanal stated, "The Zero could
outmaneuver, outclimb, outspeed us. One Zero against one Grumman
is not an even fight, but with mutual support two Grummans are
worth four or five Zeros." In speaking of the wildcat's rugged-
ness, another pilot exaggerated, "A Zero can't take two seconds'
fire from a Grumman and a Grumman can some times take as high as
fifteen minutes' fire from a Zero." In the first six months of
the war against Japan, the F4F rolled up a kill ratio of 3:1
(meaning for every three planes shot down by a Wildcat, one wild-
cat was destroyed in the air by a Japanese pilot). At the end of a
year the ratio increased to 5:1, and by the end of the war it was
nearly 7:1. 9 The F4F Wildcat performed it's Job well.
The Wildcats domestic competitor in the manufacturing arena,
the 3uffalo, did not fare nearly as well. In it's limited combat
it performed di sas t r ious ly . Even if it's poor U. S. battle record
was discounted (for it did serve Finland adequately in the
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country's struggle with the Soviet Union), the F2A was a failure
with the Navy because it could not survive the carrier environ-
ment. As historian John Lundstrom noted, "The Brewster airplane
simply lacked the strength for prolonged service at sea." 120
Buffaloes experienced a high number of carrier deck crashes,
largely due to an inadequate undercarriage. These mishaps caused
naval pilots to lose confidence in the F2A. Brewster's reputation
sank farther into the depths when the Corsairs it built during the
war suffered wing stress, with several losing their airfoils
during aerobatics. The scandalous activities of the company forced
it out of business.
Grumman
' s Avenger also achieved great distinction during the
war. Deliveries of the torpedo-bomber began in January 1942. After
the TEFs were "devastated" on 4 June at the Battle of .Midway (as
were the first six Avengers to see combat), the TBF became the
only torpedo-bomber used by the American Navy through the rest of
the war. It continued to serve various functions with the Navy
until 1954.
The Grumman airplane that presented the best performance
during the Pacific war was the F6F Hellcat, which was only being
built as a prototype when the American battleship fleet was made
obsolete on 7 December 1941. After recording it's first production
flight in November 1942, it made it's combat debut early in the
Fall of 1943. For the next two years it dominated the skies over
the vast Pacific. Hellcats virtually won the Battle of the Phili-
pine Sea single-handedly by destroying a large majority of Japan's
carrier aircraft and pilots while defending the task force off the
:.iarianas. In two years of aerial combat, F6Fs destroyed 5,155
enemy aircraft, nearly 75% of all Navy and Marine Corps "kills"
made in the entire war. Only 270 Hellcats were lost to enemy a-
viators, giving the F6F an impressive kill ratio of 19:1. ^ The
vaunted Corsair, often considered the best pi
s
ton-engined naval
fighter ever produced, had a 10.5:1 kill ratio 122
,' h e n the Hell-
cats escorted attack aircraft to the assigned tar pets, only fortv-
two of the bombers were lost to enmeny combatants, making the
fighter an appreciated chaperone. It was also a mechanic's dream,
allowing it to be ready for operations 90 to 95ii of the time, the
highest mark in the fleet. J when the F6F began to be replaced in
the air superiority role by the Corsair, which had proved it's
ability to operate off carriers while serving with Britain's Koyal
>iavy, it stayed aboard the fleet carriers as an attack aircraft,
even though it was not specifically designed for such a role. The
Hellcat and the wildcat provided cheap but effective carrier
fighters
The F7F Tigercat and the F8F Bearcat (a project started after
the beginning of the war) were joining the fleet and marine units
when the atomic blasts ended the conflict. Neither saw any major
combat, though the F7F did serve as a night-fighter for the
.Marines for several months. Both would see action in Korea a few
years later, but by this time they were over-shadowed by the jets.
The perf ormance of these planes was superior, to the warbirds, and
had the war continued in the Pacific they would have upheld the
reputation built by their predecessors.
Table 3.3 provides a list of all the carrier-fighters to be
used by the Navy during the war. It shows the relative short per-
iod utilized for design and experimental work on the company's
warbirds, which was a contributing factor to the success of these
planes. The quick design phase coupled with the squared features
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Table 3.3
Air Design Proto- First Produc- 5th Air- Years Years
plane ,Vork type Flight tion plane up to Front-
Started ordered order delivery 5th line
del Service
F2A mid 1935 6/23/3S 1/--/38 6/11/33 6/--/39 4 2 3/4
F4U 2/—/38 6/11/33 5/29/40 4/02/41 Late 42 4 1/2 12 +
F4F-3 raid 193o 10/--/36 2/12/39 3/03/39 3/--/39 2* 6
Fbf 5/—/41 6/30/42 12/02/43 - - - - 4/—/44 3 8
* This figure is somewhat misleading for it does not include the
work on the XF4F-1 biplane nor the -2 monoplane which lost in a
flight competition to the F2A, but this variant had been altered
enough to use the starting date listed.
Source: Problems Accelerating Aircraft Produc t i on ... , Harvard
Business School, p. 16: plus a.y own personal compilation of
facts attained throughout the sources listed in the biblio-
graphy .
of the corporation's airframes which were easily manufactured,
helped Grumman mass porduce the aircraft used during the war.
This integration also allowed the most economical means to
make aircraft be utilized. Grumman was very proud of the fact that
it had the lower-priced carriers available to the fleet, as Table
3.4 shows. The cost per pound of aircraft produced by the Sethpage
Table 3.4 : Prices For ,Vorld ,;ar II Carrier-Fighters
Price per Empty ,-,eight Price/lb.
Airplane Airplane of aircraft of aircraft
Brewster F2A 323,302 4,420 lbs. $6.40
Grumman F4F 326,472 5,238 lbs. $5.05
Grumman F6F 335,000* 9,025 lbs. $3.33
Vought F4U $50,000** 8,932 lbs. S3. 57
* As stated in Anderson's Hel lcat
,
p. 23. The 27 Sept. 1943
article in Li f
e
entitled "Navy's Newest Fighter," has a
lower figure of $24,000.
** Anderson states Hellcat costs 2/3rds of Corsair.
manufacturer was decreasing in the war period. The price of
Grumman's aircraft compared to it's competitors was favorable. The
comparison between the F2A and the F4F in Table 3.4 was a good
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illustration in that it co.-nes from two production orders in rough-
ly the same period for the exact same number of airframes (54).
Likewise the F6F and F4U prices were those at the end of tne war
when both had been built in nearly equal amount. Good designs,
and efficient production leading to comparatively low prices, were
the key components to the success of the period from 1939 to 1941.
Cone 1 us i on
The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation's orders and
finances followed a parabolic pattern through it's first twelve
years in operation, (See Diagram C.l and C.2) similar to the pro-
duction in the periods of peacetime equilibrium and rearmamental
instability according to the wave theory presented by Robin
Hicham in Air Power: A Concise History . Unlike the industry,
which reached it's low point in peacetime production in 1933,
Grumman was growing rather than declining before this point.
.Management's planning to stay in business while the engineers pro-
duced their initial designs, and it's decision to produce fighters
and amphibians for the Navy were vital to this initial success.
The Navy's purchase of experimental and production models of each
of the first five designs produced by Grumman was also a major
reason for it's rise. The reasons for these initial orders were a
combination of the quality of engineering and the needs of the
Navy with it's expanding carrier force.
From 1934 to 193S Grumman grew at roughly the same pace as
naval aircraft expenditures. It's progression in this period was
closely associated with the rise of carrier aviation. Grumman
supplied the majority of fighters and single-engine amphibians for
the Navy. The firm also associated it's growth by constructing
aircraft for export and commercial markets. Production was the
most important element of this period, and the firm's consistent
fair pricing, with perhaps one exception, and the performance of
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Table C.31 Aircraft Production, 1940-45
Production hij
Company Sumlier of Units
North American 41.188
Convair
.30.903
Douglas 30,696
Curtiss-Wright 26. LSI
Lockheed 18.926
Boeing 18..381
Grumman 17.428
Republic 15.60.3
Bell 13,575
Eastern Aircraft D ivision.
General Motors 1.3,449
Martin 8.810
Chance-Vought 7.890
Ford 6,791
Goodyear 3,940
Production by
Airframe Weight Percent ofS-Year
Company ithousands of lbs! Gram! Total
Douglas 306.573 15.3
Convair 291.073 14.6
Boeing 226,447 11.3
North American 210.913 10.5
Lockheed 180,118 9.0
Curtiss-Wright 136.091 6.9
Martin 126.970 6.3
Ford 123. 076 6.2
Republic 75.893 3.9
Grumman 73.767 3.7
Bell
.53.037 2.7
Eastern '" 47.869 2.4
Chance-Vought 28.952 1.4
Goodyear 13.668 0.7
All other plants 101,136 5.1
Grand total—
a
11 plants 1,995,613 100.0
SOURCE: \V. F. Craven and J. L. Cult. "Men and Plimw." as cited in Jnlin Bell Roe
Climb In Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1920-imO (Cambridge Mass • MIT
Press. 1968), p. 168.
* Eastern aircraft Division of General motors built
airframes from Grumman' s designs, thus the number
of planes built from the company's blueprints was
even higher.
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the aircraft produced allowed it to expand.
The war years of 1939 to 1941 were a jreat stimulus to the
growth of the corporation. Orders leaped upward in 1939 and sky-
rocketed in 1940, and gross income followed suit, although it
lagged behind the orders by one year. The quick, yet skillful
engineering work on the warbirds was a major factor in the success
of this period, for it allowes the new designs to play a major
role in the upcoming war. The cheap costs compared to it's com-
petitors was an added bonus to the Navy. The expansion that came
in the beginning of 1939 with the aid of public finance, and the
building of a new plant in 1940 funded by European orders and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation were important in supplying
aircraft early in the war. The expansion from 1939 to 1941 in men,
machines, and work space placed the company in a position to be
able to obtain the orders during World War 11.
Appendix 1; Investments and Stock
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Table A-lj
Investor
ORIGINAL IMESTKiL'T
Shares
A. p. Loening
Grover Loening
Leroy Grumman
Leon Swirbul
E. U. Poor
F. G. Towl
^ub-tptal
3 March 1930
Investment
Bill Schwendler
£. W. Poor
2d Vfeick
Julie Kolpit
Total
Preferred
100
200
100
_50_
450
Money for Shares
100
200
675
325
ICO
_50_
1-450
125
20
40
Preferred
510,000
20,000
10,000
5.000
545.000
1-675 545.000
*2,500
5,000
16,375
3,125
2,500
1,250
536.250
53,125
500
1,000
1.000
Total Money
512,500
$25,000
516,375 + 575
$ 3,125
512,500
* 6.250
531.250 r J75
541.375
5 3,125
$ 500
5 1,000
5 1.000
586.375 + 575
Source; Richard Threulsen, The Grumman Story , pp. 32, U.
Adds the three incorporation shares purchased by Grumman.
^
e U"Se
?
XiStS " W7 >25°> °f wiiioh available funds equalled ,n^
* 53,825 (In Guggenheim Medalists initial capital stated as 567 000)
when giving final total Threulsen lists 536,750, with 564,325
actually available, only slight^ less than ay addition.
18 December 1930 "Agreement and Consent of Stockholders and Subscribers
to modification and Partial Cancellation of Certain Subscription «g3ements"
caused a reduction in the par value of preferred stock by 50*. but left
common stock alone.
January 1933; Montauk Research Corporation formed to keep the patents
and property of Grumaan. Aircraft Engineering Corporation mder Control
of those who had already invested. Each of the nine stockholders wasgiven the same number of shares as he owned in the company. Each sharegiven a par value of one dollar.
°"** «=" *n-
t^HZ ll^L^T™ JTounoed ** *>»*1 So public with its stock, regis-ering L40,CO0 shares of common stock with the Securities Exchange Commis-
si
1
Sm°if j!CW2 CVrent t0 "" ^^^ 50m to Gru2man «***•", and40,000 was held back for exercise of warrants.
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Appendix 2: The Airplanes
a=L -2-
Dimensions; Span; 34' 6'" Length; 24" 6" Height; 11' 1"
Speed; Landing: 65 m.D,h». \ , .. .,, ......
,-J . ..; - ", :. . . ..
Maximum ; 201 m.p.h. (575 h.p.), 220 m.p.h. (775 h.p.); -2, 207 m.p.h.
Cruising : 191-200 m.p.h.
Climbi avg. ; 1,000
initial : 1,724-1,800 feet per minute (depending on engine)
Service ceiling; 21,000-25,000 feet (depending up->n engine)
Range/fuel cptyj 800 miles/120 gal. (575 h.p.), 6V7 miles/120 gal. (775 h.p.)
Line sketchings
of the FF-1
Source: Swanborough
and Bowera, United
States Maw Aircraft
Since 1911. o. 196 .
vfUMMAH Ft. I
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F2F
Dimensions; Span* 28' 6" Length;
Wing area; 230 sq. ft.
21' 5" Height; 9' 1"
Speed; Maxt 237 m.p.h. (MM), 257 m.p.h. (.aright)
Cruising; 215 m.p.h.
Landing • 66 m.p.h.
Climb Rate;
Average
i
2,500 ft./min.
ilnitial; 2,700 ft./min.
ceiling; 27,500 ft.
Powerplant; Pratt St. Whitney R-1535-72, Wright "Cyclone" R-1S2Q-F5J
650 h.p. 750 h.p.
Weight; 3,847 lbs (gross load)
Range/Fuel capacity: 750-985 miles/110 gallons
Armament; Two Browning .30 in. machine guns in the nose.
n. •«. B« si„g,..1M, nshM mw (650 , p. pran 4 Whtaey ;,win.wup Junl„,. e;8fn; );
103
F3F
Dimensions-;
Span » 32' Length' 23' 2"
Wing area J 260 sq. ft.
Height i 9' 4"
Speed;
Maximum
Cruising
Landing
Climb Rate;
Average
Initial
Ceiling
Powerplant
F3F-1 F3F-2
» 240 m.p.h
1 215 m.p.h.
• 66 m.p.h
'2,700 ft/min
•29,000 ft.
' 650 h.p.
P&W Twin
Wasp Jr.
Weight/max : 4,100 lis.
Kange/fuel : 720 miles/
110 gal.
260 m.p.h.
241 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h.
32,000 ft.
750 h.p.
Wright
Cyclone
4,620 lis.
975 miles/
130 gal.
£21=3
264 m.p.h.
242 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h.
2,750 ft/min.
33,300 ft.
950 h.p.
Wright
Cyclone
4,795 lbs.
980 miles/
130 gal.
Armament
Price :
Experiment: $75,840
Production:
per unit 1 $16,525
one
.30 and one .50 in.. Brownings
$26,300
$16,536
$12,750
$25,037
**
* ^V? the fflodi*iO**ian of the last F3F-2 into the 2F3F-.^
«SfL^LfT" ^ th9 "aVy d±d not ™ -tensive tS3 '
A M.
./ 26« „M F3f.2 Grumm„s ,.,fM.n -^
F4? wildcat (Martlet') :
Dimensions; Spani 38' Length: 28' 9" Height: 11' 10"
Ming area: 260 sq. ft.
10U
Speed;
Cruising
Landing
Climb Bats;
Average
Initial
Ceiling
Powerplant
'.'.'eight/max
Eange/fuel
Armament
Prices
per unit:
A good view of
the Wildcat's
(Martlet's)
"plank-like"
wing.
F4F-3
331 m.p.h.
37,500 ft.
1200 h.p.
PM 2 stage
2 speed twin
'.•asp
7,065 lbs.
S60 miles/
160 gallons
(4) .50 MG
U) $26,472
(2) 323,361
JM=2A_
312 m.p.h.
34,300 ft.
1200 h.p.
single stage
2 speed
'..'right Cyo.
6,876 lbs.
825 miles/
160 gallons
(4) .50 KG
JM=4_
318 m.p.h.
34,900 ft.
same as
F4E-3
7,964 lbs.
770 miles/
160 gallons
Wildcats were the exclusive carrier-b.aea,
fighter aircraft for the U.S. Navy in theA
Jri'rea^f^ejcarjnj^facific. .' ~» k go<yd^
at the Grumman
fighter '
s
fuselage.
(Photo: NAjMJ "•' - ^xx^ji- 3^
Picture Source: Jlikesh, Robert, ^National
Air and Space Museum," Smithsonian Inst.
?5F Skyrocket (XP-50) ;
Span
Length
Height
Max. speed
Cruising speed
Initial rate
of clicb
Ceiling
Powerplant
XF5F-1 XP-50
42 feet 42 feet
32 feet
12 feet
3S0 m.p.h. it
16.500 feet
424 m.p.h.
317 m.p.h.
4CO0 ft./min. similar to ?5F
33,000 feet 40.000 feet
Two 1,200 h.p.
1 Wright Cyclones
R-1820-40
Two 1,200 h.p.
bright Cyclones
E-1820-67/69
10,553 lbs
585 miles/217 sal
'•1eight/max.
Range/fuel
* Proposed specifications since the iP-50 crashed during
its initial flight before statistics could be gained.
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F6F Hellcat;
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Dimensions;
Span : 42' 10" Length; 33' 10"
Wing are«-s 334 square feet
Height; 14' 5"
XF6F
Speed
Maximum ' 375 m.p.h.
Cruising 2GG m.p.h.
Landing 82 m.p.h.
Climb rate
Initial 2,980 ft. /nan.
Average 2,350 ft./min
Ceiling
'
35,500 feet
F6F-3 F6F-5
391 m.p.h.
200 m.p.h.
82 m.p.h.
3,650 ft./min.
3,100 ft./min.
39,400 feet
410 m.p.h.
200 m.p.h.
32 m.p.h.
similar to -3
3,150 ft./min.
38,800 feet
Powerplant
Weight/max.
Range/fuel
1 Originally 1,600 ' Pratt & Whitney's
h.p. Wright R-2600 2000 h.p
replaced by P & U
2000 h.p. in IF6F-3
Pratt & Whitney
'
z
2000 h.p.
(R-2800-10 or 1DW, (R-2800-1CW)
11,629 lbs.
1,500 miles
250 gallons
13,221 lbs.
1,350 miles
250 gallons
12,593 lbs.
1,900 miles
250 gallons
Price Price had originally been approximately $50,000 per
plane, however price cut to $35,000, and even to about
?24,000
Sources: Anderton, Hellcat
0'L«ary, Naval Fighters of World 'War II in Action
F7F ;
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Dimensions;
Span : 511 6" Length J 45' 6g"
Wing area : 455 sq. ft.
Height; 13' 9"/ 14' 7™
Speed}
Ma y-iTmim
Cruising
Landing
Climb rate;
average
Initial
Ceiling
Powerplant
Weight/max.
Range/fuel
Armament
XF7F-1
430 m.p.h.
ISO m.p.h.
approx. 70 knots
4,200 ft./min.
42,600 feet
Two 1,800 h.p.
Wright Cyclones
SS-26OO-I4
20,107 lbs.
1,160 miles
406 gallons
Four 20 mm in
wing root and
Four .50 in.
in the nose
F7F-2M"
445 m.p.h.
190 m.p.h.
5,200 ft./min.
41,000 feet
Two 2,100 h.p.
Pratt & rthitneys
R-2800-22W
21,690 lis.
1,800 miles
Four 20 ram and
rocket capable
g7F-3
460 m.p.h.
190 m.p.h.
6,000 ft. min.
40,000 feet
Two 2,100 h.p.
Pratt Sc Whitneys
R-280O-34W
21,906 lbs.
l,9CO miles
Source; O'Leary, United States Naval Fighter of World jar II in Ant. -Un
I Poole, Dorset; Blanford Press, 1980), p. I44.
JF. J2F :
Dimensions
;
Sp*" ; 39' Length; 33' / 34' Height; 12' 8" / 15' 1"
Wing area i 409 sq. ft.
108
Speed;
Madman
Cruising
Landing
Cl-;,-ih rate
Ceiling
Powerplant
Weight/luax.
Range/Fuel
Price
JF-2
185 m.p.h.
155 m.p.h.
65 m.p.h.
1,600 ft./sin.
775 h.p. wight Cyclone
5,760 lbs
620 miles/ 150 gallons
$ 20,944 in contract
for 11
J2F-5
138 m.p.h.
150 m.p.h.
65 a.p.h.
1,500 ft./min.
27,000 feet
850 h.p. iiright Cyclone
Ii-1320-50
6,711 lbs
780 miles/ 190 gallons
5 33,193 in contract
for 144
Sourcesj ''American Planes & Engines for 1938," Aviation, vol. 37(February 1938), pp. 35-66. (Used for JE-2)
Swanborough & Bowers, United States Haw Aircraft Since
1911. 2cd ed.. (Annapolis; U.S. Naval Institute Press.
19681,_p._204._
Source: "Grumman Utility,"
Aviation, vol. 33 (Dec.
1934), p. 391.
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Grumman TBF-1C Avenger Specification
Power Plane One Wright R-26U0-8 (Cyclone 14)) iwo-rott
14-cylinder air-cooled radial engine rated imilitarvl at 1,700
rip at 2.600 rpm from sen icvel to\',000 ft i^l ; miand 1.450 hf
at 2.600 rpm between 7.H0O tu2.3"5 m) and 12.000 m i* 66;j
m), or (normal) 1.500 hpai 2.400 rpm trom bed level u. " .auOf:
(I 770 m) and 1.350 hp al 2.400 rpm between K.9O0 ft (2 71 5
m) and 13.000 ft (3 960 m). Three-bladed Hamilton Standard
^onstant-speed propeller ol 13 ft (3.^6 m) diameter Muncard
internal fuel capacity of 335 US gal ( 1 269 !i comprising 147
US gal (557 II main tank with 9-X US gal i356 I) pon and
starboard. Provision for two 58 L'Seal (220 I) underw if*, tanks
and (ferry) 2"T : US gal ( I 042 I) jettfsonabie capons ha* tank.
Performance: (Al 16.412 It*" 444 k«): Max speed. IX** mpb
(401 krarh)ai^-ak'vel.2.^ 7 mnht4Ukm hi.it 1 2.000 ti' *.nhti
in); range I.IU1VC. 153 inph.l 2-lo kin hi; Imu. to 1 0,000* l u5tl
in), 13 mm. to 20.000 ft \u tW5 ui). 4 I -6 rain; service ceiling.
21.400 ft (6 525 mi; max range (internal fuel). 1.105 mis.
(1 778 km), (with two drop tanks), 1 .390 mis (2 236 krr. i: terry
lange (with weapons bay and underwing tanks). 2.ca5 mis
(4 320 .km).
Weights: Emptv equippec 10 <S5 lb (4 7&fc Kg); loadeit lone
Mk 1 3-2 torpedo). 16.4 1 2 it' v 7 444 kg), (fotr 500-lb- 226.8-kg
hombs), 16.426 lb (7 450 k*(. (Mk 13-2 tor iedo and underw-
ing tanks). 17.364 lb (7 876 kg)
Dimensions: Span. 54 ft 2 in ( :6",5l m), folded). 19 ft o m (5. ""3
m); length. 40 ft 9 in (12.42 rn): height (tail .town). 13 ft 9 in
(4.19 m); wing area.490sq ft (45.52 m-); wheel track. 10 ft 10
in (3,50 m)
Armament: t Defensive!. Tw< fixed for*;.rd-nnnK <J-5-in
f 12,7-mm) machine guns with MX) rpg, one 0-5-in ( 12.7-mmj
machine gun with 400 rounds in power-ope._Jted dorsal turret
and one 0-3- in (7.62 -mm) machine gun with *00 rounds tiring
aft from ventral position ( Offensive): One Mk 13-2 torpedo.
one 1.000-lb (453.6-kg) bomb or four MlO-tb (226.3-kg)
bombs.
SRUM^iAN Model No. S-44 (Widgeon)
—s?3?
Specifica.ions: Span 40 ft. overall length 31
ft., overall height t) ft., landing gi-ur tread JO
in., wing loading 1S.....» lb. per so., ti.. power
loading 1L3B ft- J»« hp.. weight empty 3.O.J.
ross weight 4,300, powered by two lUuger en-
gines with a total rating of 400 h|> -c sea level.
fu«4 capacity 108 gallons, normal r_aige * -p
miles, fuel consumption at cruising speed -0 fjal-
"f.n> wr hour, wing aret i inelu'.lug aileron.-
*.'" 3Q. ft., aileron area 'total* i-i.u" sti. ft., j;.
. ,.a 1T.3 •>!. ;'.- rudder area ±4 *q. It.. si-..-u •
;. r .irua ^5.5 s*i. ft., total c.uvutur arcu lU.ij
•q. . . Seats rive.
L'ti-oHMASCE' Cruising «|lw1 150 miles per
iiui— ut an n;.it'.-le of •shJ>- .; . stalling >&ean
<J1 adka i-«'r hull., ciimb At »« level aTu it. per
min ice. service ceiling l^.UoO ft.
Grumman flirc. Engineering Corp.!
G*V: W«ight
ie-alane Gross Weight 7500 ibs.
'lirftline Empty Weight 5320 lbs.
Orittl Load 2180 lbs.
fcrimum Oil Capac-
gg (15 Gals.) 112 lbs.
mjonnim Fuel Capac-
ity (220 Gals.) 1320 lbs.
"~(750(f lbs.)
__ Speed at _
fjttft. 205M.P.H.
jyiiiiimm Speed at
v'Sq Level 195 M.P.H.
Cruising Speed at 9600
ft. (300 H.P.) 193 M.P.H.
Cruising Speed at 3000
ft. (300 H.P.) .... 184M.P.H.
Cruising Speed at Sea
Level (300 H.P.) ... 175 M.P.H.
Maximum Rate of
Ciimb at Sea Level 1490 Ft. per Min.
Climb to 5000 ft 4.4 Min
21
'Climb to %M> fl ) M,„.
Si-rvtrr Oiling. 24.1NMI l'l.
AImuIuIc Ceiling _'.\W«J Kt.
Absolute Ceiling Willi
One lillgilre (7500
lbs.) 14,OO0Ft.
Take-off Run at Sea
Level 7V0 1''t. /
Take-off Time at' Sea
Level 11 Sees.
Take-off Time at Sea
Level (Calm, glassy) ISSecs.
Landing Speed at Sea
I •vi-l (Rips Down) H0M.P.I1.
Fuel Consumption with
_J00_H.P „ 52 Gals, per Hr.
fttrnw MPTl. Pimer 1*1 «/». "iSf 7,ii,
9.600 Ft. 193 75% 506.... 795
5.000 Ft. 184 75% ... 480 755
5.000 Ft. 150 46% ... 740 1150
Sea Level 175 75% ...460 720
a,
S
uo
HW<Js(
Appendix 4
Aircraft Prices
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U.S. Haval Fighters of the
Plane
Boeing F43-3
Boeing F43-4^
Gruranan FF-1
Curtiss 3FC-2
Curtis a BF2C
Proto-
type
ordered
( 5/10/30)
[ 6/30/31)
Proto-
type
Price
$ 50.000
1930s and World War II
Production
price
$17.414
j 82.152
i 4/ 2/31)
1 4/16/32)
Gruiaman F2F
Grunaan F3F-1
Brewster F2A
Gruraaan F4F-3
Gruaazan F6F
Vought F4U
(11/ 2/32)
(10/ /34)
( 7/25/36)
(
(10/-/3S)
I 73.975
(2 at)
|104. 712
$ 75,340
5 26,300*
$ 12,750*
( 0/30/41)
( 6/11/38)
$10.900
$19.000
314.731
$15-313
314,815
316,525
$16,536
?25,037
$28,302
26,472
$35,000
$50,000
initial
contract
(> in year)
30 in 1931
38 in 1932
27 in 1932
28 in 1932
27 in 1934
54 in 1934
54 in 1935
81 in 1937
27 in 1938
Co5t
per
lb.
I 7.59
$ 4,65
3 5.90
I 4.85
$_5^op_
$ 5.64
54 in 1938
54 in 1939
12,000
2,000
I 5.75
3 5.09
$ 7.70
6.40
3 5.05
.63
^ 5.57
Modification of production airframe
When conparing prices, one should look at the nueber purchases andthe year. For example, the original F2A and F4F production sales natch
very well, since both are for the sate nnaber of airfrai.es and were
purchased in nearly the saae tijne period. The F6F and F4U are als-
a good ConparlBon. These two show that Gruraan's warbirds were cheaper
to buy. The lower costs of Curtiss' and Boeing's fighters in 1932 show
that there were other reasons besides cost that allowed Grunsnan to take-
over the carrier fighter market in the nid-1930s.
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The Grumman Corporation, the First Twelve Igara
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation saw its origins in 1930,
and twelve years later it would be the United States best supplier of
fighter aircraft. It produced by far the most naval fighters used during
the Second World *ar. This thesis looks at the development of the Company,
primarily its financial growth, and its relationship to the U. S. Navy.
The Navy was the company's main market thoughout most of the period, and
both it and the corporation would benefit from their work together.
The first section of the thesis looks at the formative years of
Grwanan Aircraft, and how it was able to grow despite the odds it faced.
These were being a small business unassoci.it ed with a holding company and
not belonging to the Manufacturers Aircraft association, thought to be two
necessities to gain military orders, and the impact of the depression on
the aircraft industry, * primary reason for the firm's growth was. its
choice of the United States Navy as Its prime market; and the Navy's
treatment of the new company, giving it a preferred status while it was
getting established.
The second part observes the Company's work in the mid-1930s, when
it held a monopoly on U. S. naval fighters. It looks at the performance
of these airplanes and the short duration lives of military aircraft in
this period caused by a technological revolution. This section also shows
the upward linear progression of Grumman' s business figures. This
progression was still related with the Navy.
The third part shows the growth of the business from 1938 to 19U,
and the effects the war had on it. The war in Europe caused the linear
progression to begin to curve upward. It also forced the ailitai? expert
market to replace the U. S. Navy as the corporation's prise market. This
situation was short-lived, for as the United States began preparing for
war the Navy returned as it dominant buyer.
The conclusion discusses the benefits Gruinnan and the Navy gained
from their relationship. It also analyzes the business picture for the
entire twelve years. The statistics show the growth moved in a parabolic
(wave-like) fashion during the period, and that the United States Navy
was responsible for most of the progression. The Navy would be repaid
for its investment in World '.Jar II.
